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The Class Differential in Privacy Law 
Michele Estrin Gilman† 
INTRODUCTION 
Many Americans are willing to divulge personal 
information and even sacrifice civil liberties for the benefits of a 
wired world. They will turn over their spending habits for the 
convenience of shopping on-line, submit to body scanners and 
suitcase searches to travel by air, and tolerate Facebook selling 
their personal information to third parties in order to network 
with friends.1 These sorts of surveillance bargains are rarely 
struck by the poor. Low-income Americans travel more often by 
bus than plane, they lack money to shop at Amazon.com, and 
they are less likely to have a computer that makes social 
networking possible in the first place.2 This digital and economic 
divide does not mean, however, that the poor are insulated from 
privacy intrusions. On the contrary, they endure a barrage of 
  
 † Professor of Law and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of 
Baltimore School of Law. B.A. 1990, Duke University; J.D. 1993, University of 
Michigan Law School. For their feedback on this article, I would like to thank Matthew 
Fraidin, Leigh Goodmark, Dan Hatcher, Rebecca Hulse, Margaret Johnson, Rob 
Rubinson and the faculty participants at the AALS Women Rethinking Equality panel 
on Gender and Economic Equality, and the Poverty and Economic Mobility symposium 
at the Washington College of Law. The University of Baltimore School of Law provided 
support for this article. 
 1 See Gary T. Marx, Soft Surveillance: The Growth of Mandatory Volunteerism 
in Collecting Personal Information—“Hey Buddy Can You Spare a DNA,” 10 LEX 
ELECTRONICA 2 (Winter 2006), http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v10-3/marx.pdf 
(listing various bargains individuals strike between privacy and surveillance). “Although 
people acknowledge the importance of privacy, most value other things even more.” Jeff 
Sovern, Opting in, Opting out or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal 
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (1999). For instance, while many people will 
claim to oppose privacy intrusions, they will willingly turn over Social Security numbers 
and other personal information to telemarketers. Andrew Askland, What, Me Worry? The 
Multi-Front Assault on Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2006); see also James 
P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2003) (people support information privacy, but “understand that [their] interests in 
privacy must be balanced against other interests”). 
 2 See Lindsay Greer, Questioning Digital Citizenship: The Answer to Economic 
and Political Inequity?, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 655-57 (2008) (reviewing 
KAREN MOSSBERGER ET AL., DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP: THE INTERNET, SOCIETY, AND 
PARTICIPATION (2008)) (explaining that historically disadvantaged groups, including low-
income Americans, have less access to the Internet and lower rates of use). 
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information-collection practices that are far more invasive and 
degrading than those experienced by their wealthier neighbors. 
The law reinforces this class differential in privacy.  
Consider the case of Rocio Sanchez.3 In June 2000, Ms. 
Sanchez, after separating from her husband, applied for welfare 
benefits and food stamps at a San Diego County welfare office to 
support her infant daughter.4 One month later, an investigator 
from the Public Assistance Fraud Division of the San Diego 
District Attorney’s Office made an unannounced visit to her 
home pursuant to a county policy called Project 100%, which 
required home visits of all welfare applicants who were not 
suspected of fraud or ineligibility.5 The investigator asked Ms. 
Sanchez a series of questions about her husband and his 
whereabouts, when she had last talked with or seen him, and 
the reasons for their separation.6 He then searched the home, 
including her bedroom closet, and left to question her neighbors.7  
Ms. Sanchez encountered the investigator a few days 
later when he arrived at her former residence searching for her 
husband.8 She was there alone, cleaning the residence so that 
she could recover the rental security deposit.9 In her presence, 
the investigator proceeded to search the bathroom cabinets, the 
bedroom, and the dresser drawers⎯all of which were empty.10 
Again, he questioned Ms. Sanchez about her husband, 
including asking why she was still speaking to her sister-in-law 
if she was in fact separated.11 He demanded that she pull out 
papers from her husband’s trash can that might lend clues to 
his location, remarking that it was “funny” that she had never 
filed a domestic violence complaint.12 Two months later, the 
county approved her application for benefits.13 Nevertheless, 
Ms. Sanchez was upset by these interrogations, particularly 
the accusatory tone taken by the investigator,14 and she became 
  
 3 These facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint in Sanchez v. 
County of San Diego. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, 
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 00-CV-1467JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 10, 2003), aff’d, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).  
 4 Id. ¶ 12. 
 5 Id. ¶¶ 12-13. 
 6 Id. ¶ 14. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. ¶ 15. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. ¶ 16. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. ¶ 17. 
 14 Id. ¶ 16. 
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a plaintiff in a class action lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of Project 100%.  
Ultimately, in Sanchez v. San Diego, the Ninth Circuit 
relied on Wyman v. James, a Supreme Court opinion from 
1973, and upheld the home visits against a Fourth Amendment 
challenge, reasoning that “a person’s relationship with the 
state can reduce that person’s expectation of privacy, even 
within the sanctity of the home.”15 In a bitter dissent from a 
denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, seven Ninth Circuit 
judges called the case “nothing less than an attack on the 
poor.”16 As the dissenters stated, most government benefits do 
not flow to the poor, “yet this is the group we require to 
sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.”17 By contrast, 
“[t]he government does not search through the closets and 
medicine cabinets of farmers receiving subsidies. They do not 
dig through the laundry baskets and garbage pails of real 
estate developers or radio broadcasters.”18 As the dissenters 
concluded, “This situation is shameful.”19  
Welfare administration is highly devolved in that states 
and localities have great discretion in how they structure their 
welfare programs.20 So in another jurisdiction, Ms. Sanchez 
might have been subjected to drug tests or finger imaging or 
unsolicited family-planning advice, such as pressure to implant 
a Norplant birth control device.21 Throughout the country, poor 
women such as Ms. Sanchez face constant surveillance as they 
must comply with extreme verification requirements to 
establish eligibility for welfare benefits, travel to scattered 
offices to procure needed approvals, reappear in person at 
welfare offices at regular intervals to prove their ongoing 
eligibility and answer intrusive questions about their child 
  
 15 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 16 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id. 
 20 See Christine M. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 101-04 (2002). 
 21 See, e.g., Harry Murray, Deniable Degradation: The Finger-Imaging of 
Welfare Recipients, 15 SOC. F. 39 (2000) (discussing finger imaging); see also Pamela D. 
Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment’s 
Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401, 404-10 
(2000) (discussing Norplant); Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: 
Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 751 (2011) (discussing drug testing). 
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rearing and intimate relationships.22 Further, under federal 
law, all jurisdictions engage in extensive data sharing with 
other government and private offices to ferret out fraudulent 
public assistance applications.23  
The poor are subjected to privacy intrusions not only by 
governments but also by private parties, such as employers. 
Although a stated goal of welfare is to move welfare recipients 
into the workforce,24 even if Ms. Sanchez obtained a low-wage 
job,25 surveillance of her life and personal choices would likely 
continue. In the white collar workforce, employers regularly 
monitor e-mail, Internet, and phone communications of their 
employees, raising the specter that information could “fall[] 
into the wrong hands or . . . [be] used for a purpose we did not 
envision when we disclosed it.”26 Nevertheless, most white 
collar workplace monitoring is invisible and easy to ignore, 
which may in part explain the lack of public outrage or 
legislative protections against workplace surveillance.27 By 
contrast, low-wage workers are concentrated in service 
industries.28 They are more subject to visible—sometimes 
humiliating—surveillance tactics such as psychological testing, 
regular drug screening, and overt videotape monitoring.29  
Criminal justice scholars have described a class 
differential in privacy under the Fourth Amendment,30 which 
protects reasonable expectations of privacy from warrantless 
government searches and seizures.31 People who live in 
crowded, urban neighborhoods and who cannot afford “a 
freestanding home, fences, [and] lawns,” have a lowered 
expectation of privacy and are thus more likely to suffer 
  
 22 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The 
Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 664-65 (2005). 
 23 Id. at 672-73. 
 24 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006) (stating that a purpose of Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) Act is to “end the dependence of needy parents on 
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage”). 
 25 JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE 
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 191-99 (2007) (describing how TANF welfare departments 
have adapted to the work-first mandate). 
 26 See Nehf, supra note 1, at 27. 
 27 See Daniel O’Gorman, Looking Out for Your Employees: Employers’ 
Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy, 
85 NEB. L. REV. 212, 273 (2006). 
 28 See Devah Pager et al., Employment Discrimination and the Changing 
Landscape of Low-Wage Labor Markets, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320. 
 29 See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.  
 30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 31 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401-05 (2003). 
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warrantless searches by government agents.32 These realities of 
geography also mean that poor families are far more likely to 
become entangled in intrusive child welfare and domestic 
violence investigations.33 In addition, the homeless have 
virtually no privacy at all; courts have held that their meager 
shelters are not entitled to protection from government 
searches.34 At the same time, the federal government mandates 
computerized tracking of the homeless, requiring them to 
divulge personal data when they seek social services.35 
Meanwhile, more Americans with financial means are moving 
into gated and private communities, thus buying themselves 
privacy.36 As the experience of Ms. Sanchez reveals, this class 
differential extends beyond the criminal justice context into 
every corner of daily life. 
Low-income Americans are a diverse group living 
individualized lives; they are “indescribably varied and 
multifaceted.”37 Despite this diversity, they share the reality of 
  
 32 Id. at 401. 
 33 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: 
The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 413, 433-41 (2005) (describing child welfare investigations); Jeannie Suk, 
Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 59-60 (2006) (describing criminal justice 
interventions in domestic violence cases that result in “poor man’s divorce”). 
 34 See, e.g., D’Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1995) (people 
who lived in a homeless campsite on private property did not have a reasonable 
interest in privacy); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1473 (10th Cir. 1986) 
(no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cave located on public lands); Amezquita v. 
Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975) (squatters on public land had no reasonable 
expectation to privacy); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cardboard box used as a residence); 
Whiting v. State, 885 A.2d 785, 799-801 (Md. 2005) (squatter’s expectation of privacy 
was not reasonable); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 561 A.2d 783, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989) (squatter in abandoned rowhouse did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy). Homeless persons have had better success with Fourth Amendment 
challenges to the searches of their personal property. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. 
Supp. 1551, 1570-71 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (homeless persons had reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their personal belongings); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991) 
(defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a duffel bag and box located in 
the area under a highway bridge where he was living; court did not rule on whether he 
had a reasonable privacy interest in his “home” itself). The law is contradictory with 
regard to homeless shelters. See Steven R. Morrison, The Fourth Amendment’s 
Applicability to Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 333 (2009). 
 35 See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.  
 36 See Georgette Chapman Phillips, Boundaries of Exclusion, 72 MO. L. REV. 
1287, 1302-03 (2007) (“in 2001 there were 7,058,427 households living year-round in 
gated communities in the United States” and the law upholds these residents’ 
expectations of privacy and rights to exclude others).  
 37 JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND 
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20-21 (2001) (describing demographic, political, physical, and 
regional variations among the poor). On the importance of seeing and understanding 
the poor as individuals with their own narratives, see Frank Munger, Identity as a 
Weapon in the Moral Politics of Work and Poverty, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE 1, 20 
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experiencing privacy quite differently on a daily basis than do 
middle and upper class Americans. Given that at least 15 
percent of the population⎯or one out of seven Americans⎯ 
currently lives below the poverty line,38 this differential demands 
attention and discussion. To be sure, sophisticated surveillance 
technology combined with limited legal protections should be a 
serious concern for all Americans. Still, for most Americans, 
these privacy intrusions are felt as a vague sense of unease over 
being watched along with concerns about identify theft (an old-
fashioned crime with a new twist). By contrast, low-income 
Americans suffer tangible harms from government and 
corporate surveillance that go beyond discomfort. The privacy 
intrusions they face are often overt, and the harms are concrete.  
The American privacy law regime has developed to 
reflect middle-class concerns, and as such is focused on 
preventing the misuse of information after it is collected. By 
contrast, low-income people tend to face stigmatization at the 
time information is gathered. The poor interact with the 
government and low-wage employers in ways that are ongoing 
and interpersonal, and, as a result, a “right to be left alone”39 
does not protect their interests in dignity and autonomy. This 
article argues that poor Americans experience privacy 
differently than those with economic resources and that the law 
reinforces this differential. This differential has costs not only 
for the poor, but for all citizens. Our privacy laws and policies 
should reflect equality norms to ensure that poor Americans are 
not unfairly subjected to humiliating surveillance tactics. 
The class differential in privacy law results from 
complex interactions between class, race, and gender. Because 
poor Americans are disproportionately minority and female,40 it 
is impossible to talk about class without taking into account 
how subordination is linked to race and gender. Critical legal 
theorists have shown that anti-poverty public policies are built 
on racist, gendered notions about the people who need relief. In 
  
(Frank Munger ed., 2002). Munger writes, “If we understand [poor persons] not as 
sinners or saints but as constituents of the mainstream like ourselves, we will be 
willing to allow them the same latitude to fail or succeed that we grant insiders within 
our own communities.” Id. at 15. 
 38 See Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, at A1 (stating that the Census Bureau reported a 15.1 
percent poverty rate for 2010).  
 39 This foundational concept of privacy was articulated by Samuel D. Warren 
& Louis D. Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890); see also 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 40 See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 81, 88 (2d ed. 2006). 
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turn, these public policies impact all poor people⎯even those 
who are not minorities or female.41 The result is that the poor 
as a group suffer extreme privacy violations, which in turn pose 
a barrier to self-sufficiency and democratic participation.  
Part I of the article describes how low-income Americans 
experience privacy in the welfare system and low-wage 
workforce. Women moving along the welfare-to-work continuum 
face a bevy of humiliating surveillance tactics, and, as Part I 
explains, the physical and mental health consequences of unfair 
surveillance undermine welfare’s statutory goal of self-
sufficiency.42 Part II of the article analyzes how the law privileges 
middle-class privacy interests but fails to protect the poor from 
privacy intrusions. As a constitutional matter, courts often hold 
that the poor do not have reasonable expectations of privacy 
entitled to protection. As a statutory matter, laws primarily 
protect against the misuse of data, rather than its collection, and 
thus reflect middle-class privacy concerns. As a common law 
matter, the law focuses on reputational injuries; it has not 
expanded to prohibit demeaning surveillance practices that target 
the poor. Accordingly, Part III explores robust conceptions of 
privacy that focus on values safeguarded by privacy, such as 
dignity, respect, and trust. This part views privacy as a means 
rather than an end. It concludes that class equality needs to be a 
central concern of privacy law and suggests this can be achieved, 
in part, by ensuring that data collection practices are fair and 
undertaken with respect for their subjects. 
I. SURVEILLANCE OF THE POOR 
Privacy is an amorphous concept, despite the 
considerable efforts of theorists to pin it down. Scholars have 
variously described privacy as the right to be let alone;43 the 
  
 41 See infra text accompanying notes 300-03 (discussing Dorothy Brown’s 
theory that racist ideas underpinning Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) enforcement 
impact poor white Americans as well); see also ICELAND, supra note 40, at 38-39 
(discussing research showing a misperception that that most poor people are black and 
how that perception has political consequences); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE 
WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 3-4, 60-80, 154-73, 
204-06 (1999) (explaining how negative media coverage of poor black Americans has 
perpetuated stereotypes of the black poor as undeserving and generated public opposition 
to welfare).  
 42 From the perspective of welfare recipients, economic self-sufficiency has 
multiple dimensions, including “the exercise of personal power and freedom.” Elizabeth 
A. Gowdy & Sue Pearlmutter, Economic Self-Sufficiency: It’s Not Just Money, 8 AFFILIA 
368, 383 (Winter 1993). As discussed infra, surveillance undermines autonomy. 
 43 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193. 
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ability to control personal information44 and access to the self;45 
a precondition to intimate relationships and the development of 
community;46 and an essential component of human dignity, 
autonomy, personhood, and self-determination.47 Clearly, privacy 
is connected with multiple values, and thus a lack of privacy can 
impact the self as well as interpersonal relationships. For the 
poor, surveillance by the government and employers implicates 
multiple values. Part A describes the nature of privacy invasions 
suffered by the poor in the areas of welfare receipt and the low-
wage workplace. These focus areas are not comprehensive, but 
they illustrate how large societal institutions encroach upon the 
lives, homes, and bodies of poor individuals. Part B then examines 
emerging psychological research to assess the harms caused by 
privacy invasions. These harms amount to far more than hurt 
feelings; the poor suffer physical and mental health injuries 
associated with extreme stress.  
A. Privacy in Welfare and Low-Wage Employment 
Poor people regularly experience privacy deprivations 
related to their personal information, bodies and homes, and 
decision making.48 This surveillance serves to control and limit 
the autonomy of poor people, and has strong historical roots. 
“Politically, the purposes of surveying the poor have largely 
stayed constant for three centuries: containment of alleged 
social contagion, evaluation of moral suitability for inclusion in 
public life and its benefits, and suppression of working people’s 
resistance and collective power.”49 Technology has enhanced 
the ability of the state and private corporations to achieve 
these ends. Although participation in government entitlement 
programs and particular employment is technically voluntarily, 
the reality of life and the marketplace is such that the poor 
  
 44 ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 45 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980). 
 46 See JULIE INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56, 58 (1992). 
 47 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1609, 1655 (1999). 
 48 The three broad categories of privacy interests are information, spatial, 
and decisional. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1998). 
 49 Virginia Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship: Surveillance and Political 
Learning in the Welfare System, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL 
POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 89, 90 (T. Monahan ed., 2006) (emphasis 
omitted); see also GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 19 (“From today’s computerized information 
systems . . . and back to the surveying and badging of the poor in sixteenth-century 
Europe, governments have closely examined those who seek assistance.”). 
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have little choice but to subject themselves to these privacy 
invasions. Notably, the surveillance imposed on the poor is 
usually overt; indeed, part of the purpose is to create stigma. 
By contrast, other Americans are increasingly subject to “soft” 
surveillance, which involves less invasive techniques, hidden 
technologies, and implied consent.50 These methods of soft 
surveillance raise deep concerns about civil liberties and lack of 
choice,51 but they are profoundly different in character and 
effect than the unconcealed, coercive surveillance tactics used 
with low-income populations. 
1. Welfare  
As discussed in the Introduction, Ms. Sanchez, a welfare 
applicant, faced informational, spatial, and decisional privacy 
intrusions by the state. She had to provide welfare officials 
with detailed information about her family, submit to home 
searches, and justify the state of her marriage. Her experience is 
emblematic.52 A typical applicant for welfare, called Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), must undergo a 
multistage, multiday application process consisting of screening 
interviews, application interviews, group orientations, and 
employability assessments.53 She must answer questions 
  
 50 See Marx, supra note 1, at 1-3. For instance, Marx describes police asking 
community members to provide voluntary DNA samples by mouth swab. Id. at 1. Marx 
also describes other “disingenuous communication that seeks to create the impression 
that one is volunteering when that isn’t the case,” such as building signs stating that 
one agrees to a search upon entering the premises and consumer reward programs that 
rely on giving up personal information. Id. at 2.  
 51 Id. at 5-6. These new tactics are driven by “the mass media’s 
encouragement of fear and perceptions of crises,” “the seductiveness of consumption,” 
and “the development of inexpensive, less invasive broad searching tools.” Id. at 6 
(footnote omitted). 
 52 For the similarly intrusive questioning poor pregnant women are subjected 
to as a condition of receiving Medicaid benefits, see infra text accompanying notes 358-
61, discussing Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 113, 114-16 (2011). 
 53 See HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC. ET AL., STUDY OF THE TANF APPLICATION 
PROCESS 2-3, Exs. 2-1 & 3-3 (2003) [hereinafter STUDY OF THE TANF APPLICATION 
PROCESS], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/app-process03; PAMELA HOLCOMB ET AL., 
THE APPLICATION PROCESS FOR TANF, FOOD STAMPS, MEDICAID, AND SCHIP: ISSUES FOR 
AGENCIES AND APPLICANTS, INCLUDING IMMIGRANTS AND LIMITED ENGLISH SPEAKERS 3-6 
to 3-9 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410640.pdf; MARCIA K. 
MEYERS & IRENE LURIE, THE DECLINE IN WELFARE CASELOADS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 26 (2005) (conference draft), available at http://www.npc.umich.edu/news/ 
events/newdirections/Meyers1.pdf. In Los Angeles County, the criminalization of 
welfare is seen in the application process:  
Today, a person who wants to apply for public assistance in L.A. County must 
visit an Eligibility Office. In these prisonlike structures, visitors pass through 
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ranging from her resources and sustenance needs to her 
psychological well-being.54 Her own word is not enough; she 
must also provide independent verification of her answers to 
many of these questions, either through her own documentation 
or through information gathered from third parties,55 and in 
some cases, caseworkers conduct investigations themselves.56 As 
part of TANF, an applicant must also comply with child support 
enforcement efforts by providing detailed paternity information 
about her children.57  
Once a welfare mother turns over personal data, this 
information is electronically shared and compared with numerous 
federal and state databases, as well as commercial databases, to 
verify eligibility and to ferret out duplicate or otherwise 
fraudulent applicants.58 At any time, law enforcement officials can 
demand that welfare and housing officials turn over personal 
information about benefits recipients, even when the recipient is 
not herself suspected of any crime.59 By contrast, state officials 
cannot conduct similar fishing expeditions into the bank accounts 
of those individuals with the means to maintain savings.60  
Many jurisdictions distribute benefits electronically, 
which allows them to monitor when and how funds are spent.61 
While affluent Americans submit to market-research 
surveillance designed to cater to their purchasing preferences, 
the electronic systems that monitor the poor “facilitate the 
invasive scrutiny of their purchases and discipline of their 
  
metal detectors and past armed security guards on their way to the clerk who 
is cloistered behind a Plexiglas window. There they must wait for hours in a 
crowded waiting room before being seen by an Eligibility Worker.  
Alejandra Marchevsky & Jeanne Theoharis, Dropped from the Rolls: Mexican 
Immigrants, Race, and Rights in the Era of Welfare Reform, 35 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 
71, 79 (2008). 
 54 See STUDY OF THE TANF APPLICATION PROCESS, supra note 53, at 3-7.  
 55 See MEYERS & LURIE, supra note 53, at 27; HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 53, 
at 3-16. 
 56 See Mulzer, supra note 22, at 676. 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000). 
 58 See Allison I. Brown, Privacy Issues Affecting Welfare Applicants, 35 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 427 (2001); see also Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, 
Consequences and Validity of Family Law Provisions in the “Welfare Reform Act,” 14 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 10-21 (1997).  
 59 See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 668-69 (2009).  
 60 Id. at 669.  
 61 See Christopher D. Cook, To Combat Welfare Fraud, States Reach for Debit 
Cards, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 1999, at 5 (describing how states monitor 
purchases by welfare recipients). 
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behavior.”62 As a result, these systems limit “clients’ autonomy, 
opportunity, and mobility: their ability to meet their needs in 
their own ways.”63 
Physical privacy is not only invaded by home searches, 
but public benefits recipients may also be fingerprinted and 
photographed, usually through biometric imaging.64 Moreover, 
as part of child support enforcement, TANF recipients must 
agree to DNA testing for themselves and their children if 
paternity is contested.65  
Further, TANF permits states to invade the decisional 
privacy of welfare mothers in order to control their behavior to 
align with middle-class norms.66 While the law governing 
decisional privacy is outside the scope of this article (it involves 
reproductive rights and family autonomy), it overlaps with data 
collection because the state transmits its behavioral expectations 
to poor mothers during the application and certification stages of 
public benefits programs.67 The most controversial of these sexual 
regulation policies is the imposition of family caps.68 Typically, 
family caps provide no cash benefit increases for any children 
conceived while the mother is on welfare.69 Several jurisdictions 
have also pushed “Norplant” bonuses, which cover the cost of   
 62 Torin Monahan, Surveillance and Inequality, 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 217 
(2008). 
 63 Eubanks, supra note 49, at 90-91.  
 64 See Nina Bernstein, Experts Doubt New York Plan to Fingerprint for 
Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at B1 (listing states that fingerprint welfare 
recipients); see also HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 53, at 3-1 to 3-25 (explaining that 
Dallas, TX and New York, NY use fingerprinting and photographing to screen public 
benefit recipients); Murray, supra note 21, at 39-40. 
 65 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(C) (2006).  
 66 See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 25, at 282-315 (describing and 
critiquing the “family values” provisions of TANF). 
 67 See Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties, Privacy, Private Choice, and Social 
Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 461-63 (1987) (defending and defining concept 
of decisional privacy); Bridges, supra note 52, at 135-48 (tracing development of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on decisional privacy); Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the 
Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847-49 
(2000) (describing feminist and legal conceptions of decisional privacy); Linda C. 
McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 124-50 (1992) 
(describing development of Supreme Court case law on decisional privacy and how it 
relates to poor women); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy 
in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 147-52 (describing connections between 
equality and decisional privacy rights). 
 68 See Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary 
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 173-77 (2002). 
Slightly less than half the states have adopted a family cap. Id. at 174. 
 69 See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive 
Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 165-67 (2006). In 
states with the family cap, about nine percent of the caseload has been impacted by the 
family cap policies, resulting in about twenty percent less in cash assistance per family. 
Id. at 170-71.  
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implanted, long-term contraceptive devices for welfare mothers, 
sometimes with an additional cash award.70 In addition, many 
states bestow upon welfare mothers unsolicited family-planning 
advice in the form of counseling sessions, family-planning 
classes, pamphlets, and encouragement to give their children up 
for adoption.71 In short, poor women seeking public benefits face 
limitations across multiple dimensions of privacy. 
2. Low-Wage Workplace 
Low-wage workers—currently one-third of the 
workforce—are workers whose wages are so low that full-time 
work does not push them over the poverty line.72 Immigrants, 
single mothers, and African-Americans are disproportionately 
represented among low-wage workers.73 They are concentrated 
in the service sector, often working in retail, as custodians, as 
care providers for children and the disabled, and as security 
guards.74 The service sector uses the widest range of surveillance 
techniques. With modern technology, employers can log 
computer keystrokes, listen to telephone calls, review e-mails 
and Internet usage, conduct drug tests, employ mystery 
shoppers, watch closed-circuit television, track employee 
movements through GPS or radio frequency devices, and require 
psychometric tests.75 Yet the uses of the data generated by these 
tactics “are not made clear to employees, policies outlining their 
use are not in place, and information practices are not subject to 
any third-party audits or checks.”76 
While there are ample studies and recommendations 
about employer surveillance in the white collar workforce, the 
low-wage workforce remains mostly ignored by privacy 
scholars. Due to the lack of study, much evidence about 
surveillance practices in the low-wage workforce is anecdotal. 
In the best-selling book Nickled and Dimed, author Barbara 
Ehrenreich went undercover in a series of low-wage jobs such 
  
 70 See Smith, supra note 69, at 168-69; see also Bridgewater, supra note 21, at 
404-05 (arguing that the state’s coercive use of Norplant to hinder the reproductive 
rights of African-American women violates the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 71 See Smith, supra note 68, at 169, 177-81.  
 72 PAMELA J. LOPREST ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHO ARE 
LOW-WAGE WORKERS? ASPE RESEARCH BRIEF (2009), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
hsp/09/LowWageWorkers/rb.pdf. 
 73 Michael Selmi, Unions, Education, and the Future of Low-Wage Workers, 
2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 151-52.  
 74 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 329 (2009). 
 75 Kristie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An Overview, 51 LAB. HIST. 87, 88-90 (2010). 
 76 Id. at 91.  
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as a diner waitress, nursing home attendant, cleaning woman, 
and Wal-Mart salesperson.77 Throughout the book, she explains 
how each job was physically and mentally demanding as well 
as financially draining, given the costs of housing, food, and 
lengthy commutes.  
The jobs were also privacy-stripping. Of all the workforce 
indignities, Ehrenreich was most surprised and offended at the 
loss of self-respect engendered in low-wage jobs.78 For instance, 
as a waitress, Ehrenreich “was warned that my purse could be 
searched by management at any time.”79 She remarks that 
“[d]rug testing is another routine indignity. . . . In some testing 
protocols, the employee has to strip to her underwear and pee 
into a cup in the presence of an aide or technician.”80 Ehrenreich 
also found pre-employment personality tests demeaning; they 
include “questions about your ‘moods of self-pity,’ whether you 
are a loner or believe you are usually misunderstood.”81 
Reflecting on these intrusions, she states, “It is unsettling, at the 
very least, to give a stranger access to things, like your self-
doubts and your urine, that are otherwise shared only in 
medical or therapeutic situations.”82  
Ehrenreich’s experience appears widespread in the low-
wage workforce. For instance, a study of Latina nannies found 
that they escaped the isolation of their jobs by congregating with 
other nannies in public parks.83 Thus, when their employers 
came to the park to check on their children, the nannies felt that 
it signaled a lack of trust.84 Whereas the nannies wanted 
autonomy to do their jobs, these visits transformed the park 
from “the nannies’ space into another site of surveillance” 
similar to the employers’ homes.85 For these workers, a public 
space was a private refuge, which demonstrates the context-
specific nature of privacy and how it promotes values of dignity 
and autonomy. In other words, domestic workers sometimes have 
too much “bad” privacy (they work isolated in someone else’s 
home) and not enough “good” privacy (ability to work and live 
  
 77 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKLED AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN 
AMERICA (2001). 
 78 Id. at 208. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 209. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Armada Ameta, Creating Community: Latina Nannies in a West Los 
Angeles Park, 32 QUALITATIVE. SOC. 279, 279 (2009).  
 84 Id. at 289. 
 85 Id. at 290. 
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with some measure of respect and independence).86 For domestic 
workers, privacy can be hard to come by, even as they are 
expected to respect the privacy of their employers by discreetly 
staying out of sight.87 Moreover, their working conditions are 
negotiated in the privacy of the employer’s home, where the 
bargaining differential is pronounced and where workers are 
susceptible to abuse.88  
Migrant farmworkers also face an alarming lack of 
privacy, as they live in employer-provided housing.89 David 
Shipler describes a North Carolina barracks used to house 
migrant workers during sweet potato season, in which up to 
fourteen men live in a room that measures twelve by fifteen 
feet with no opportunity for solitude.90 
These sorts of class differentials are found throughout 
the low-wage workforce. For most white collar workers, drug 
testing is limited to situations that implicate public health or 
safety.91 By contrast, drug testing is regularly part of pre-
employment screening for low-wage jobs.92 Routine drug testing 
and location tracking via satellite positioning devices are also 
most prevalent in jobs with the lowest status and salaries.93 
Likewise, “[t]he majority of employees being electronically 
monitored are women in low-paying clerical positions.”94 
Similarly, pre-employment psychological tests—commonly called 
  
 86 See Joy M. Zarembka, America’s Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern 
Day Slavery, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW 
ECONOMY 142, 142 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) 
(describing the isolation and dangers faced by domestic workers). This is true for home 
health care attendants as well, who are supposed to be “invisible” to foster the 
independence of those for whom they care. See Lynn Mae Rivas, Invisible Labors: 
Caring for the Independent Person, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra, at 70, 72-74. 
 87 See MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. 147 (2002). Speaking about live-in 
maids, Romero writes: “The combination of not having a bedroom and not having 
access to the rest of the house for resting or leisure activity continually affirms the 
worker’s inferior status in the employer’s home.” Id. 
 88 Id. at 129. 
 89 DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 98-99 (2004).  
 90 Id. at 98 (“its configuration could have had no purpose other than to house 
workers—and to deprive them of their dignity”).  
 91 Nancy D. Campbell, Everyday Insecurities: The Microbehavioral Politics of 
Intrusive Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY, supra note 49, at 65. 
 92 Id. at 66.  
 93 KENNETH D. TUNNELL, PISSING ON DEMAND: WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING AND 
THE RISE OF THE DETOX INDUSTRY 24 (2004) (“The body of evidence clearly shows that 
social class and income are inversely related to drug testing; working-class members with 
the lowest incomes are those most likely to be subjected to drug testing.”).  
 94 Paul S. Greenlaw & Cornelia Prundeanu, The Impact of Federal Legislation 
to Limit Electronic Monitoring, 26 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT., Summer 1997, at 227, 229, 
available at http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/9707093594/impact-federal-
legislation-limit-electronic-monitoring.  
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honesty tests—are concentrated in the “retail, fast food, 
banking, and other service industries,” even though “their 
accuracy and predictive value are doubted.”95  
Many low-wage employers use multiple methods to 
control their workers. For instance, a study of workers in the 
fast food and grocery industries found extensive forms of 
surveillance, ranging from rows upon rows of hanging video 
cameras to drug tests to honesty tests, in which applicants 
were “asked about illegal behavior, such as whether they have 
taken drugs or stolen anything in the past, or about the 
behavior of their friends and acquaintances, such as whether 
they know anyone who takes drugs or steals,” as well as 
questions about how they would react in various scenarios.96  
At the same time, just because “people give up 
information in exchange for jobs and other valued outcomes 
should not be construed as meaning that doing so is voluntary.”97 
Rather, in today’s workplace, an employer has almost no 
restraints on the forms and extent of surveillance it chooses to 
adopt, and in today’s tight labor market, employees have little 
choice but to submit.  
B. Harms and Justifications  
Poor individuals, families, and communities suffer 
tangible harms—psychological, material, and physical—as a 
result of the class differential in privacy policies and law. These 
harms are disproportionate to the justifications underlying 
privacy intrusions, and yet they remain invisible to many 
Americans. One privacy scholar has criticized other privacy 
theorists for failing to show how “privacy violations can 
negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings 
beyond simply provoking feelings of unease.”98 She argues that 
if we do not identify the harms of privacy invasions, privacy 
will continue to deteriorate. Part of the apathy may be that 
privacy theorists have neglected the poor. Indeed, one privacy 
  
 95 Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How 
to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 
517, 540 (2001). There are almost no legal protections against these tests. Id. at 541. 
 96 STUART TANNOCK, YOUTH AT WORK: THE UNIONIZED FAST-FOOD AND 
GROCERY WORKPLACE 47-48 (2001).  
 97 Eugene F. Stone-Romero et al., Personnel Selection Procedures and Invasion 
of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 343, 345 (2003).  
 98 Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 52, 52 (2006), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
11-2006/Bartow.pdf. 
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scholar admits that “privacy is seldom a matter of life and 
death;” rather, “[m]ost of the injuries caused by the misuse of 
data in modern society are not particularly embarrassing or 
emotionally disturbing.”99 This is not true for the poor. 
For the poor, the injuries are concrete. Recent studies 
within the public health field show that when the state treats 
marginalized people with a lack of dignity, the results can 
include “loss of respect, loss of self worth, ego, sense of self, and 
soul, loss of status, social standing, and moral standing, loss of 
confidence and determination.”100 There are long-term effects as 
well, such as “social isolation or marginalization, a reluctance to 
seek help or access resources, passivity or ‘learned helplessness,’ 
a ‘small’ life of constrained choices, chronically poor physical and 
mental health, and a cycle of victimization and abuse, in which 
the violated individual turns to violating others.”101 These are 
psychological attributes that undermine the odds that poor 
families will become self-sufficient,102 which is the goal of the 
welfare system and, indeed, our liberal society. 
1. Welfare 
The welfare system of surveillance causes recipients to 
suffer psychological injuries including stress, fear, and feelings 
of degradation.103 While procedures such as drug tests and finger 
imaging may have instrumental purposes, they also send a 
degrading message to and about welfare recipients.104 This is 
because these procedures have symbolic meaning within our 
cultural traditions—“drug testing challenges traditions that 
urination is a private affair; and finger-imaging conjures up an 
image of criminality.”105 These procedures “freeze a moment in 
time while ignoring the ongoing context of inequality and 
structural violence.”106 Not only is the subject’s dignity 
degraded by these procedures, but society also receives a 
message that “reinforce[s] negative stereotypes of the 
  
 99 Nehf, supra note 1, at 30. 
 100 Nora Jacobson, A Taxonomy of Dignity: A Grounded Theory Study, 9 INT’L 
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 7 (2009). 
 101 Id. 
 102 See generally Joaquina Palomar Lever et al., Poverty, Psychological Resources 
and Subjective Well-Being, 73 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 375 (2005) (describing how certain 
psychological attributes help people cope with poverty, while others are harmful). 
 103 See GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 66-67, 78 (summarizing interviews with 
welfare recipients in Appalachia in the early 1990s).  
 104 Murray, supra note 21, at 40. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Campbell, supra note 91, at 72. 
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targets.”107 In turn, these stereotypes drive punitive laws 
directed at the poor. 
Not surprisingly, the privacy deprivations and 
humiliations associated with welfare discourage many needy 
women from seeking assistance.108 Without state assistance, 
these nonentrants to the TANF system and their children often 
lack adequate resources for food, shelter, and other basic 
needs⎯even if they are working. Studies have shown that 
nonentrants struggle to make ends meet by juggling a shifting 
array of nonpublic resources and that this hardship negatively 
impacts their health.109 In short, accepting welfare can subject 
one to humiliation, but refusing it can result in hunger. This 
“choice” hardly promotes autonomy or dignity. 
Further, mandatory child support cooperation policies 
can result in the unintentional perpetuation of domestic 
violence.110 Battered women are overrepresented in the TANF 
population.111 To reduce the dangers of exacerbating domestic 
violence through reporting requirements, TANF attempts to 
protect victims by allowing states to grant these victims an 
exemption from the cooperation requirement.112 Yet many 
eligible women are not claiming the exemption for a variety of 
reasons, including the public setting of the welfare office, fear 
that child welfare authorities may take their children, stringent 
requirements for independent corroboration, and feelings of 
humiliation and embarrassment.113 As a result, the paternity 
  
 107 Murray, supra note 21, at 42. 
 108 See ROBERT MOFFITT ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A STUDY OF 
TANF NON-ENTRANTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
PLANNING AND EVALUATION 2, 14 (2003) (new welfare reform policies discourage 
participation). “[Many] non-entrants in our study felt that applying for TANF was an 
unpleasant, time-consuming experience that resulted in little financial benefit. . . . Many 
felt the application process to be overly intrusive.” Id. at 20 (Part B). 
 109 Id. at 45. One study found that:  
mothers jeopardized their own health and well-being when trying to provide 
for their families by taking on second, third, and fourth jobs, working odd 
hours, or commuting long distances via public transportation. . . . [Moreover, 
i]n order to acquire and maintain affordable housing, many families were 
forced to live in unsafe neighborhoods. . . . [And finally, m]others with young 
children consistently had trouble securing stable care for [their children.]  
Id. 
 110 Susan Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child Support 
Enforcement, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 664 (2000). 
 111 See Smith, supra note 68, at 153-54 (although batterers come from all social 
classes, TANF clients are especially vulnerable because they have fewer economic supports). 
 112 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2006). State implementation varies widely, and most state 
policies are not adequate to protect battered women. See Smith, supra note 68, at 158. 
 113 See Smith, supra note 68, at 165-66; Notar & Turetsky, supra note 110, at 672-76. 
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disclosure required by the child support system poses a 
substantial risk to domestic violence victims for very little 
benefit. After all, these mothers do not receive any of the child 
support checks that are collected; rather, the state keeps the 
money to repay itself for the costs of welfare.114 Notably, TANF 
recipients lack the decisional autonomy of nonpoor single 
mothers, who are “not forced to identify, marry, live with, seek 
support from, or interact with the biological father.”115  
Fraud prevention is the usual justification underlying 
welfare surveillance.116 For welfare mothers, this translates 
into home visits, fingerprinting, and elaborate third-party 
verification schemes. However, there is scant data on welfare 
fraud, even though states presume it is widespread.117 To be 
sure, there are applicants who do not report all sources of 
income. Because it is impossible to survive on welfare benefits 
(the average monthly benefit for a family of three is $363),118 
some welfare applicants accept support from family members 
or earn additional income from jobs such as babysitting or 
cutting hair.119 Welfare mothers are in a bind—they must earn 
unreported income to provide for their children, but this 
conduct is considered “fraud.” Thus, in some cases, the state’s 
low welfare stipends and rigid earning limits create the very 
fraud that the state seeks to eliminate. 
Further, studies show that women convicted of welfare 
fraud sometimes fail to report income for circumstances out of 
their control, such as when their partners hide their income or 
force them to keep it secret.120 In addition, many cases of fraud 
are unintentional and occur when welfare applicants either do not 
understand the complex income and resource reporting rules of 
  
 114 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating 
the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1029, 1045 (2007).  
 115 See Smith, supra note 68, at 140. Non-welfare families can use child 
support enforcement services, but they can withdraw on a voluntary basis. See Notar & 
Turetsky, supra note 110, at 671. 
 116 See Gustafson, supra note 59, at 658-61, 674-81, 683-88 (describing how 
fraud concerns have spurred the criminalization of welfare).  
 117 Murray, supra note 21, at 50 (“There is little systematic information on the 
form of welfare fraud known as double-dipping.”). 
 118 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES: SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 75 (2006). 
 119 See GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 67, 100; see also KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA 
LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE 
WORK 168 (1997). 
 120 Richelle S. Swan et al., The Untold Story of Welfare Fraud, 35 J. SOC. & 
SOC. WELFARE 133, 140 (2008). 
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TANF, or are misinformed by their caseworkers.121 The jobs 
obtained by welfare mothers tend to be unstable with fluctuating 
schedules and incomes, which can also lead to reporting problems 
when anticipated and actual income differ.122 “In short, the U.S. 
system both produces and punishes lawbreakers.”123 Better clarity 
in welfare rules and improved training of caseworkers could go far 
in fixing the sorts of errors that get mislabeled as intentional fraud. 
Still, fraud is grossly overstated in welfare programs, 
making the draconian methods for rooting out fraud unreasonably 
invasive. For instance, New York City began fingerprinting welfare 
applicants in 1995 in an effort to root out imagined fraud.124 
However, out of 148,000 recipients, the city found only forty-three 
cases of double dipping.125 Even purveyors of electronic fraud 
detection systems have admitted that fraud is extremely rare.126 
Moreover, studies suggest welfare fraud is no more rampant in 
welfare than in other government programs,127 which are not 
subject to the same withering scrutiny. “The government takes a 
far greater risk on graduate student loans, for example, than on 
any welfare recipient.”128 Yet graduate students do not have their 
homes searched and are not fingerprinted.  
Similarly, the annual cost of tax fraud, including 
underreporting and offshore tax shelters, is immense, but 
nevertheless is not considered “morally indecent.”129 Because the 
government can root out welfare double-dipping by computerized 
  
 121 Id. at 140, 143. In turn, convictions for fraud leave these women with 
serious collateral consequences, such as inability to pass screenings for housings, 
credit, or employment. Id. 
 122 Id. at 140.  
 123 Gustafson, supra note 59, at 681. 
 124 Preston L. Morgan, Note, Public Assistance for the Price of Privacy: Leaving 
the Door Open on Welfare Home Searches, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 251 (2009).  
 125 Id.  
 126 See, e.g., Joshua Dean, Texas Nears Rollout of Fingerprint System, FED. 
COMPUTER WEEK (Aug. 5, 1999), http://fcw.com/articles/1999/08/05/texas-nears-rollout-of-
fingerprint-system.aspx (official from private contractor states that out of 700,000 people 
fingerprinted for public benefits, twelve cases were referred for further investigation). 
 127 See Mulzer, supra note 56, at 688-89 (“[F]ear of fraud has always played a 
larger role in the administration of public benefits programs than it realistically should 
have.”); Julilly Kohler-Hausman, “The Crime of Survival”: Fraud Prosecutions, Community 
Surveillance, and the Original “Welfare Queen,” 41 J. SOC. HIST. 329, 343 (2007) (“[M]uch of 
what became defined as fraud were simply attempts to supplement welfare grants with 
additional income from low wage work or living with another wage earner.”). 
 128 David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. 
L. REV. 231, 249 (1988).  
 129 Donald Crump, Criminals Don’t Pay: Using Tax Fraud to Prohibit 
Organized Crime, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 386, 397 (2009); see also Eric A. Posner, 
Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV 1781, 1783-84 
(2000) (stating that “the audit rate is currently under 2%, and of those audited only a 
small fraction (4.1% in 1995) are penalized”). 
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matching of welfare applicants against social security numbers, 
more intrusive measures such as fingerprinting, photographing, 
and home visits serve only to stigmatize recipients.130 In addition, 
welfare surveillance has societal consequences, because it 
reduces democratic participation by welfare recipients.131 
Obviously, a government program must ensure that the proper 
persons are receiving the appropriate levels of benefits. Further, 
welfare caseworkers cannot link welfare recipients to available 
social services without information about their needs. However, 
the level of information required from TANF applicants goes far 
beyond what is necessary to meet these goals and is often 
gathered through demeaning techniques.  
2. The Low-Wage Workplace 
The privacy losses suffered by low-income employees can 
cause humiliation, shame, and stigma. After working a series of 
low-wage jobs, Barbara Ehrenreich concluded: “If you are 
treated as an untrustworthy person—a potential slacker, drug 
addict, or thief—you may begin to feel less trustworthy 
yourself.”132 Psychological research confirms that “workplace 
humiliation can itself be as devastating as the physical or 
economic harms that are legally actionable in employment and 
other settings.”133 Moreover, “women, minorities, and some 
‘outsider’ groups” suffer disproportionate levels of humiliation.134 
In the employment context, surveillance serves many 
purposes. Employers use monitoring to deter theft, protect 
proprietary information, guard against lawsuits, discourage 
improper conduct, and monitor work performance.135 These are 
legitimate objectives. At the same time, social scientists who 
study the workplace generally conclude that employer 
surveillance tactics are overly broad to accomplish these goals, 
with damaging effects on employees’ stress levels.136 For 
  
 130 Gustafson, supra note 59, at 677 n.153. 
 131 See infra notes 373-82 and accompanying text. 
 132 EHRENREICH, supra note 77, at 210. 
 133 Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 
76 (2001).  
 134 Id. 
 135 See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: 
Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263, 1287-88 (1993); Robert Sprague, 
Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and its De-
Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 111-12 (2008).  
 136 See D. Scott Kiker & Mary Kiker, A Quantitative Review of Organizational 
Outcomes Related to Electronic Performance Monitoring, 11 BUS. REV. 295, 300 (2008) 
(analyzing research studies of electronic performance monitoring). 
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instance, a prominent two-year study of telecommunications 
employees who worked in directory assistance, as service 
representatives, and in clerical jobs linked employee monitoring 
to headaches, backaches, wrist pains, greater fatigue, a 12 
percent increase in depression, and a 15 percent increase in 
extreme anxiety.137 Other studies confirm that a variety of 
health problems can flow from employer surveillance “such as 
stress, high tension, headaches, extreme anxiety, depression, 
anger, severe fatigue, and musculoskeletal problems.”138 
Moreover, the consequences of stress are magnified in jobs 
where employees lack control over their privacy or a voice in 
establishing monitoring procedures.139 
Employers also pay a cost. At the outset of the 
employment relationship, invasive application procedures can 
limit the pool of eligible applicants, as they perceive a lack of trust 
from potential employers.140 This distrust may disproportionately 
impact the disabled as well as racial and ethnic minorities who 
“may fear that they will be stigmatized unfairly by the 
information revealed by various selection procedures.”141  
The corporate bottom line can also suffer from decreased 
employee productivity and creativity, low morale, diminished 
trust, and high turnover caused by intrusive monitoring.142 
Extreme surveillance can increase employee resistance.143 For 
instance, a study of call centers found that workers 
  
 137 M.J. Smith et al., Employee Stress and Health Complaints in Jobs With and 
Without Electronic Performance Monitoring, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 17, 23-27 (1992).  
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Reactions to Electronic Performance Monitoring, 22 HUMAN PERFORMANCE 204, 205 
(2009); see also A.F. Westin, Two Key Factors That Belong in a Macroergonomic 
Analysis of Electronic Monitoring: Employee Perceptions of Fairness and the Climate of 
Organizational Trust or Distrust, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 35, 35-42 (1992). Likewise, 
monitoring can be beneficial when it results in productive feedback to employees. See 
David Holman, Phoning in Sick? An Overview of Employee Stress in Call Centres, 24 
LEADERSHIP & ORG. DEV. J. 123, 128 (2003).  
 140 Stone-Romero et al., supra note 97, at 351, 364. A study found that 
employees consider the most invasive procedures to be lie detector tests, drug tests, 
medical examinations, background checks, and honesty tests. Id. at 363. 
 141 Id. at 364.  
 142 See D’Urso, supra note 138, at 287; Ball, supra note 75, at 93.  
 143 See Ball, supra note 75, at 94 (citing George Callahan & Paul Thompson, 
We Recruit Attitude: The Selection and Shaping of Routine Call Centre Labour, 39 J. 
MGMT. STUD. 233 (2002); Stephen Frankel et al., Beyond Bureaucracy? Work 
Organization in Call Centres, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 957 (1998)).  
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circumvented surveillance by pretending to talk on the phone, 
leaving call lines open without a customer on the line, and 
misleading customers, among other tactics.144  
Studies also show that privacy intrusions can inhibit 
organizational citizenship, defined as “discretionary behavior that 
promotes effective organizational functioning but is not formally 
recognized by reward systems.”145 Surveillance can also lessen 
communication within an organization because there is less need 
for managers to interact with surveilled employees.146 In turn, less 
communication “may lower productivity, limit the development of 
important informal organizational networks, and prevent 
employees from exchanging key job-related information.”147  
By contrast, “information privacy [is] directly associated 
with psychological empowerment,” as well as “a greater 
willingness [on the part of employees] to engage in behaviors that 
help the organization.”148 For instance, Federal Express 
implemented a successful monitoring program of call center 
employees by including their input into setting work standards, 
promoting trust, and providing a comfortable work environment.149 
In sum, both workers and employers pay hidden costs as a result 
of unfair and intrusive employee monitoring.  
II. PRIVACY, POVERTY, AND THE LAW 
This part surveys the legal system’s regulation of 
privacy for low-income people. It concludes that privacy law 
does not protect the poor. As a constitutional matter, the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard provides scant 
protection because our society has long deemed it reasonable to 
intrude upon the lives of the poor. As a statutory matter, our 
laws focus on ensuring against the misuse of data, which is a 
middle-class priority, rather than data collection, which tends 
  
 144 Id. Obviously, these forms of resistance are not good for a corporate 
bottom-line. Yet resistance is an inevitable response to surveillance systems; as Gary 
Marx writes, “[S]urveillance targets often have space to maneuver and can use counter-
technologies. . . . Humans are wonderfully inventive at finding ways to beat control 
systems and to avoid observation.” Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and 
Resisting the New Surveillance, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 369, 372 (2003).  
 145 Bradley J. Alge et al., Information Privacy in Organizations: Empowering 
Creative and Extrarole Performance, 91 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 221, 221, 223 (2006); see also 
Myria Watkins Allen et al., Workplace Surveillance and Managing Privacy Boundaries, 
21 MGMT. COMM. Q. 172, 192 (2007) (“High levels of surveillance can damage trust, 
leading to a less efficient workforce . . . and other costly consequences for organizations.”). 
 146 See Allen et al., supra note 145, at 193. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Alge et al., supra note 145, at 228.  
 149 Westin, supra note 136, at 300. 
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to stigmatize the poor. As a common law matter, the law is 
geared toward elite concerns about reputation rather than the 
humiliation that surveillance causes to low-income Americans.  
At bottom, the core principle of privacy law⎯the “right to 
be left alone”⎯ill-fits the needs of low-income Americans. Their 
vulnerable economic status leaves these citizens dependent on 
government assistance, which inevitably entails an ongoing 
relationship between the citizen and the state. Likewise, an 
employment relationship is necessarily continuing and 
interactive. Yet privacy is like an on/off switch; you either have 
it or you don’t. Privacy law does not account for intertwined 
relationships between citizens and larger institutional actors.  
A. Constitutional Privacy Rights 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects 
citizens from unreasonable searches by the state.150 In addition, 
the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to 
information privacy, which protects certain personal information 
from government disclosure.151 However, these constitutional 
privacy protections are applied differently to the poor than to 
their wealthier counterparts. As this part explains, this 
differential arises from an ingrained bias against the poor. 
1. Fourth Amendment 
Fourth Amendment privacy hinges upon 
reasonableness.152 In assessing government searches, courts 
balance the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against 
the government’s rationale for the intrusion. This test is widely 
criticized as malleable and overly favorable to the 
government.153 Moreover, encroaching technology has put 
personal information in the public square. The resulting 
dilemma is that when everyday expectations of privacy 
diminish, it becomes less reasonable to expect the government 
to respect individual privacy.154  
  
 150 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 151 See infra text accompanying notes 199-207. 
 152 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 153 See, e.g., John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 656 (calling the Supreme Court’s reasonableness 
standard “just about the most unhelpful guidepost one could have concocted”). 
 154 See Scott Sundby, Everyman’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual 
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1761 (1994). 
1412 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:4 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held steadfast to 
the principle that people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their home.155 Based on the deep-rooted Anglo-
American maxim that “a man’s home is his castle,”156 the Court 
has drawn “a firm line at the entrance to the house,”157 stating 
that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which 
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”158 The 
Court’s “housing exceptionalism”159 is consistent with empirical 
research showing that people rate searches of bedrooms and 
home interiors as highly intrusive.160 The Court’s property-based 
conception of privacy therefore favors property owners.161 By 
contrast, the Supreme Court has held that a person who seeks 
government assistance gives up her rights to privacy, even in 
her home.162 The Court thus “define[s] privacy in a way that 
makes people who are less well-off more likely to experience 
warrantless, suspicionless government intrusions.”163  
a. Home Visits 
The primary case demonstrating this discrepancy is the 
1971 case of Wyman v. James, in which the Court upheld home 
visits by welfare officials, reasoning that the visits were not 
searches covered by the Fourth Amendment because they were 
consensual.164 Of course, one can question whether someone 
who is hungry and who would otherwise be homeless without 
public benefits can truly consent in a voluntary manner. 
Nevertheless, the Court applied a rational basis standard, 
ruling that even if the home visits were searches, they were 
reasonable given the state’s interest in deterring fraud, the 
  
 155 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the 
Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there 
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (citations omitted)).  
 156 Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the 
Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth 
Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 180, 198-99 (2002). 
 157 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).  
 158 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 159 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the 
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 908 (2010). 
 160 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at 
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 739 (1993). 
 161 See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401 (2003).  
 162 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 164-72. 
 163 Slobogin, supra note 161, at 400.  
 164 400 U.S. at 317-18. 
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need to protect the children of welfare mothers, the 
rehabilitative purpose of the searches, and the lack of criminal 
consequences that flowed from the searches.165 In finding that 
the privacy deprivations were negligible, the Wyman Court 
disregarded affidavits from twelve aid recipients alleging that 
the unannounced visits were not only embarrassing when 
guests were in the home, but also when personal questions 
were asked in front of their children.166 In silencing the voices 
of poor women, the Court ignored the social context in which 
these women live and mistakenly equated forced consent with 
free choice. Moreover, the Court’s disregard of their voices is 
inconsistent with psychological and sociological research 
showing that people value home privacy because it protects 
interpersonal relationships.167  
The Wyman Court further intimated, based on Ms. 
James’s social services case file (and not evidence adduced at 
trial), that Ms. James’s son had been physically abused and 
bitten by rats, concluding that “[t]he picture is a sad and 
unhappy one.”168 The Court’s clear assumption was that poor, 
single women are terrible mothers who warrant suspicion and 
distrust. Throughout the opinion, the Court also expressed its 
distaste for Ms. James and how she ran her household.169 The 
Court disliked her “attitude,” “evasiveness,” and “belligerency”—
all of which arose from her resistance to the state and her 
entirely reasonable belief that the state could verify her 
eligibility through personal interviews and documents.170 Her 
request was simply to be treated the same as other 
beneficiaries of governmental largesse. As Justice Douglas 
remarked in dissent, “No such sums are spent policing the 
government subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship 
companies, and junk mail dealers, to name but a few.”171 
Because the poor are not a protected class under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, equality law arguments based on 
class will likely be insufficient.172 Legislation that discriminates 
  
 165 Id. at 318-24. 
 166 Id. at 320 n.8. 
 167 Stern, supra note 159, at 940. Search activity in the home can “disrupt 
domestic life, engender interpersonal conflict, reveal personal information that is 
private to and constitutive of relationships, and chill socialization and intimacy.” Id. 
 168 400 U.S. at 322 n.9. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Skelly Wright, Poverty, 
Minorities, and Respect for Law, 425 DUKE L.J. 425, 437-38 (1970)).  
 172 See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty 
Law, Dual Rules of Law & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 630 (2008). 
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against or burdens the poor is reviewed under a lenient 
rational basis standard.173  
In 2006, in Sanchez v. San Diego, the Ninth Circuit 
reaffirmed the current validity of Wyman, when it ruled that 
Project 100% (discussed in the Introduction) was 
constitutional.174 The court expressly lumped welfare mothers 
with criminals on probation to conclude that neither group has a 
reasonable expectation to privacy.175 In holding that Wyman was 
governing precedent, the Sanchez Court refused to recognize 
differences between the Wyman home visits and those of San 
Diego’s Project 100%. Key to the Wyman holding was the Court’s 
view that the social worker visits at issue were 
“rehabilitative.”176 By contrast, Project 100% is “expressly 
investigatory in nature, with no rehabilitative or service 
component,” and is carried out by law enforcement fraud 
investigators.177  
Moreover, the Sanchez Court disregarded thirty years of 
post-Wyman jurisprudence, which has significantly limited 
suspicionless, administrative searches.178 Under current law, a 
warrant and probable cause are not required for administrative 
searches that are driven by “special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement.”179 Yet this special needs doctrine 
applies only where public safety is at issue, such as in drug 
testing of railroad employees and federal customs agents, or 
where necessary to protect the health and safety of public school 
students under a loco parentis theory.180 Nevertheless, the 
Sanchez Court wedged welfare home visits into the special needs 
category, even though welfare is not an issue of public safety.  
Despite the evolution of thirty years of Fourth 
Amendment law, courts in other states have also upheld TANF 
home visits, leading Jordan Budd to conclude that “the law 
actually matters little; the poor, presumptively different, inhabit 
their own constitutional universe.”181 The adherence to Wyman 
is all the more indefensible given how welfare has changed since 
  
 173 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that rational 
basis review applies to economic regulation). 
 174 464 F.3d 916, 916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 483 F.3d 965 (2007). 
 175 Id. at 927. 
 176 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319-20. 
 177 Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional 
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 387 (2010). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citation omitted). 
 180 Budd, supra note 177, at 398.  
 181 Id. at 403-04. 
2012] THE CLASS DIFFERENTIAL IN PRIVACY LAW 1415 
the 1970s, when it was a means-tested program that came under 
attack for encouraging welfare dependency.182 Since 1996, 
welfare recipients have not only been subject to a five-year 
lifetime limit on receipt of benefits, but they also must work as a 
condition of receiving aid.183 They are fulfilling their part of this 
new social contract, but the terms still include humiliation and 
stigma. 
b. Drug Testing 
Welfare recipients have fared somewhat better in 
challenging state-mandated drug testing, which is expressly 
authorized in TANF.184 However, their victory here is tenuous 
and may be short-lived. In 2000, the district court in 
Marchwinski v. Howard struck down a Michigan law 
authorizing suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants.185 
The court stated that although the state’s professed need to 
address substance abuse as a barrier to employment was 
“laudable and understandable,” it was not a public safety issue 
and thus, did not justify dispensing with the ordinary Fourth 
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion.186 The 
court rejected the state’s argument that a “special need” arose 
from its interest in protecting children from drug abusing 
parents, explaining that TANF is not directed at child abuse or 
neglect.187 Thus, the TANF program “cannot be used to regulate 
the parents in a manner that erodes their privacy rights in order 
to further goals that are unrelated to the welfare program.”188 In 
so holding, the district court refused to allow governmental 
assistance to become an unlimited tool for social control.  
By contrast, the initial Sixth Circuit panel concluded on 
appeal that welfare mothers have a diminished expectation of 
privacy because “welfare assistance is a very heavily regulated 
  
 182 See WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY 
OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 362-85 (6th ed. 1999) (describing attacks on AFDC 
that lead to enactment of TANF). 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (work requirement); id. § 608(a)(7) (five 
year limit). 
 184 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2006).  
 185 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The decision was overturned by the 
Sixth Circuit, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), but subsequently the en banc court split evenly 
on the issue, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003). Under Sixth Circuit rules, the split resulted in 
an affirmance of the district court’s opinion. 60 F. App’x 601, 601 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 186 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.  
 187 Id. at 1142. 
 188 Id. 
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area of public life.”189 In reversing the district court, the Sixth 
Circuit identified two public safety justifications for conducting 
a suspicionless search: (1) the need to protect children from 
abuse by drug-addicted welfare mothers; and (2) the need to 
protect the public from the crime associated with illicit drug 
use and trafficking.190 This reasoning ignores empirical 
evidence that the use of illicit drugs by welfare recipients is no 
greater than in the U.S. population at large.191 The appellate 
court also found that there was a “special need” to protect the 
public fisc from abuse.192 Yet under this expansive reasoning, 
“the simple receipt of a tax deduction, credit, or subsidy 
empowers the state to conduct warrantless and suspicionless 
searches to verify that the beneficiary does not use the funds to 
buy contraband.”193 Of course, this reasoning can justify drug 
testing on all Americans, but the government is unlikely to use 
such strategies on middle-class Americans. 
On en banc review of the court of appeals decision, the 
Sixth Circuit split evenly, leaving the result of the district 
court opinion intact⎯for now.194 Across the country, state 
legislatures have expressed a renewed interest in suspicionless 
drug testing of welfare recipients,195 and Florida recently 
implemented drug testing for all welfare applicants.196 Some 
congresspersons have even suggested drug testing for recipients 
of unemployment insurance.197 As the class of economically 
stressed Americans grows, so do calls for increased public drug 
testing programs. The stigma of drug testing is a way to 
discourage the needy from seeking assistance. It diverts attention 
  
 189 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337.  
 190 Id. at 335-36. 
 191 Budd, supra note 21, at 776-77. 
 192 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337. 
 193 Budd, supra note 21, at 799. 
 194 Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App’x 601, 601 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 195 See, e.g., Chris L. Jenkins, Bill Would Require Some to Pass Drug Test to 
Get Aid, WASH. POST., Feb. 19, 2008, at B5 (discussing proposed bill in Virginia, as well 
as efforts in Kentucky and Arizona); Budd, supra note 21, at 754 (“[O]ver half of the 
states have considered legislation linking the receipt of public assistance to mandatory 
screening for drug use.”).  
 196 Florida: Welfare Recipients Face Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at 
A18. A federal district court judge enjoined implementation of the law. Lebron v. 
Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011). In 2011, Missouri and Arizona passed 
bills requiring welfare drug testing of suspected drug users. See Drug Testing and 
Public Assistance, NCSL.ORG, available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx? 
tabid=23676 (last updated Oct. 7, 2011). In all, thirty-six states in 2011 considered 
drug testing laws for various forms of public benefits. See id. 
 197 See Vicki Needham, House Republicans Propose Drug Testing for Unemployment 
Benefits, HILL (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/ 
198441-house-republicans-propose-drug-testing-for-unemployment-benefits.  
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away from systemic problems underlying the modern economy 
and towards the private behavior of citizens. It allows the 
government to wash its hands of need.  
2. Informational Privacy Under the Constitution 
The Supreme Court has suggested there might be a 
right to informational privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive due process clause, although the 
contours of this right remain murky.198 The right appears to 
protect against disclosure of personal information to third 
parties, rather than its collection, and as a result, it provides 
scant protection for the poor.  
The Court’s most recent articulation of this right 
occurred in 2011 in NASA v. Nelson,199 which involved twenty-
eight employees, including scientists, engineers, and 
administrators, who worked for the Jet Propulsion Laboratories 
at the California Institute of Technology pursuant to a contract 
with the National Aeronautics Space Agency (NASA).200 In 2007, 
NASA began requiring that these workers submit to a 
background investigation, regularly used for federal workers, 
that asks whether they have used, possessed, manufactured or 
sold drugs in the past year, and if so, if they received drug 
counseling or treatment in the past year, and that also asks a 
wide range of personal references if they have any reason to 
believe that the employee is unsuited for federal work.201 
Failure to comply with the background investigation results in 
termination of employment.202 The employees at issue were all 
classified as “non-sensitive” employees for security purposes, 
and thus claimed that the background investigation violated 
their constitutional right to information privacy.203 The Ninth 
  
 198 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2011) (assuming without deciding 
that there is a constitutional informational privacy right). 
 199 Id. at 746. Prior to Nelson, the only Court precedent on point dated from 
other thirty years ago. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977), the Court recognized 
“an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Id. at 599. Still, the 
Court in Whalen held that New York State could maintain a centralized computer file 
containing the names and addresses of all persons who obtained legal prescriptions for 
Schedule II drugs, which are drugs that have both legitimate and illegal uses. Id. at 
591. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), the Court held 
that despite an information privacy right, President Nixon could not prevent 
government archivists from reviewing his papers because there were adequate 
protections against dissemination and the intrusion was limited. Id. at 455-65. 
 200 131 S. Ct. at 752.  
 201 Id. at 752-53. 
 202 Id. at 752. 
 203 Id. at 752, 754. 
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Circuit agreed and enjoined the investigations, reasoning that 
the requested information was not narrowly tailored to the 
government’s interests in a drug free and secure workplace.204  
The Supreme Court reversed. It assumed, without 
explicitly holding, that there is a right to informational privacy 
under the Constitution.205 The Court concluded, however, that 
the background investigation did not implicate that right 
because there were adequate safeguards against public 
disclosure.206 The Court also pointed to the government’s 
interest in ensuring the security of its facilities, the fact that 
the employees engage in “important work” on the space 
program, and the pervasiveness of background checks in 
private employment.207  
In concurrence, Justice Scalia said he would reject a 
constitutional right to informational privacy because it is 
unmoored to any constitutional provision, and he mocked the 
majority’s “sheer multiplicity of unweighted, relevant 
factors.”208 He asked if the outcome would be different if the 
employees were not engaged in “important work,” but were 
instead “janitors and maintenance men.”209 Of course, the 
answer is no: low-wage employees have never had reasonable 
expectations of workplace privacy.  Under current law, the 
informational right to privacy is not implicated by the manner 
of the government’s collection of personal information.210 At 
most, it protects against public disclosure of that information.211 
For the poor, public disclosure is a concern, but so is the 
humiliating procedure by which personal information is 
gathered. On this, the courts are silent.212 
  
 204 Id. at 754. 
 205 Id. at 756. 
 206 Id. at 756-57. 
 207 Id. at 757-60. 
 208 Id. at 763, 768 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 209 Id. at 768. 
 210 Id. at 761 (majority opinion) (the concern is protecting against government 
disclosure of private information).  
 211 Id. at 755-56. 
 212 A few state constitutions protect privacy, and California has extended 
privacy protection to private conduct. Interpreting the California Constitution, a 
California appellate court held that pre-employment personality tests that asked about 
sexual orientation and religion violated the rights of applicants for security guard 
positions at Target. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991). The court held that the questions were not related to job competence. Id. at 
86. The case settled before it could be reviewed by the California Supreme Court. 
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B. Privacy Statutes 
Unlike many other countries, the United States does not 
have comprehensive privacy regulation.213 Instead, our federal 
and state statutes tackle discrete privacy issues in a piecemeal 
and reactive fashion.214 A high-profile, but typical example is 
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, which forbids video 
stores from disclosing video rental records.215 This law was 
enacted after the Supreme Court confirmation hearings of 
Judge Robert Bork, when newspapers published a list of videos 
rented by the judge, thereby causing a public uproar.216 Rather 
than a comprehensive privacy law, the United States relies 
mostly on self-regulation by the entities that gather and 
maintain personal data and puts the onus on individuals to 
police their own data disclosures.217 
Generally, American privacy statutes are guided by Fair 
Information Practices, which the Department of Health 
Education and Welfare developed in 1973 in recognition that 
“people have come to distrust computer-based record-keeping 
operations.”218 There are five underlying principles: (1) record-
keeping systems should not be secret; (2) people should be able 
to find out what personal information is contained in records; 
(3) people should be able to prevent information obtained for 
one purpose from being used for another; (4) people should be 
able to correct records about them; and (5) organizations that 
maintain personal data should ensure the data is reliable and 
take steps to prevent its misuse.219 These principles require 
transparency in data collection and storage, but otherwise do 
not constrain the methods or manner by which data is 
collected. As one scholar has summarized, “the Golden Rule of 
informational privacy [is that] sensitive personal information 
given for one purpose ought not be used for other purposes 
  
 213 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 
225-29 (2006); Paul Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910-12 
(2009) (arguing that the United States should refrain from enacting comprehensive 
federal privacy legislation). 
 214 Schwartz, supra note 213, at 912. 
 215 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). 
 216 Schwartz, supra note 213, at 935-36. 
 217 See Nehf, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 218 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED 
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 28-30 (1973). 
 219 Id. at 41-42. 
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without the express consent of the person to whom the 
information relates.”220  
1. The Golden Rule and Information Disclosure 
Certainly, adherence to this Golden Rule would benefit 
all Americans, including the poor. For instance, the federal 
government oversees the Homeless Management Information 
System (HMIS), which requires homeless service providers to 
gather data about the homeless for the stated purpose of having 
a more accurate count of the homeless and better understanding 
for meeting their needs.221 The homeless are asked to reveal 
general biographical information (such as name, birth date, and 
social security number), and can also be asked about any 
physical or developmental disabilities, HIV/AIDS status, mental 
health, substance abuse, and domestic violence.222 Each homeless 
person is given a “unique person identification number.”223  
The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), which regulates HMIS programs, is aware that 
homeless individuals might be reticent to turn over personal 
data due to “not wanting to be tracked, general privacy issues, 
vanity, embarrassment, paranoia, a desire not to qualify for a 
particular service, fear of being turned away, or simply not 
caring enough.”224 Accordingly, HUD standards regulate the 
uses and disclosure of personal information by homeless service 
providers. Disclosures are permitted only under certain 
circumstances, such as to avert a serious threat to health or 
safety.225 Yet there are still concerns that these protections are 
  
 220 Gregory T. Nojeim, Financial Privacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 81, 82 (2000). 
 221 See J.C. O’Brien, Comment, Loose Standards, Tight Lips: Why Easy Access 
to Client Data Can Undermine Homeless Management Information Systems, 35 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673, 685 (2008). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
OFFICE OF CMTY. PLANNING & DEV., HUD’S HOMELESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: 
ENHANCING HMIS DATA QUALITY (2005) [hereinafter ENHANCING HMIS DATA 
QUALITY]. “Universal data elements” are collected and aggregated across linked, 
regional Communities of Care. O’Brien, supra, at 687-88. 
 222 ENHANCING HMIS DATA QUALITY, supra note 221, at 50-51. 
 223 Id. at 53. 
 224 Id. at 12. 
 225 See Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS), Data and 
Technical Standards Final Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,888, 45,928 (July 30, 2004). 
Domestic violence advocates were concerned about HUD requirements that shelters 
collect data about clients because: 
The confidentiality of the data can be breached in various ways. The rules 
permit disclosures to oral law enforcement requests, which facilitates 
impostors pretexting the data. The technical standards do not require that 
data disclosures be logged, which limits the ability to track these impostors. 
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inadequate. For instance, permissible disclosures include those 
made in response to oral requests by law enforcement officials 
for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect or material 
witness. As one commentator has noted, “The ease of 
accessibility to client [personal information] through oral 
requests threatens to compound the already challenging task of 
eliciting complete and accurate information from homeless 
clients,”226 who are, by virtue of their homelessness, often living 
in violation of laws that regulate their public conduct. Thus, 
homeless individuals may decline social services in order to 
protect themselves from arrest. Accordingly, protections 
against disclosure of personal information are extremely 
important for the homeless.  
At the same time, even the best protection against 
disclosures does not ameliorate the impact of data collection. 
“[W]hether or not a specific individual can be related back to 
data generated out of that individual, the life of that data will 
absorb and transform the life of that individual.”227 This is 
because the entire homeless population is subject to the 
decisions that result from the aggregation of the data.228 In 
other words, “the data determines what kinds of life are made 
available by programs targeting the homeless.”229 For this 
reason, one commentator states, “Contrary to HUD’s claims, 
this population does not merely present an accurate picture of 
homelessness in the U.S., but it rather re-makes homelessness 
by reconfiguring what needs are allowed to register, and what 
services can address those needs.”230 In short, data collection 
has group consequences, in addition to individual ones.231 Yet 
privacy law focuses resolutely on the individual. Moreover, 
  
Insider fraud in law enforcement agencies can also be used to breach 
security.  
Homeless Management Information Systems and Domestic Violence, ELEC. PRIVACY 
INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/dv/hmis.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). HUD is 
planning guidance that responds to these issues in light of requirements in the 
Violence Against Women Act that require client consent before data disclosures are 
made. Id.  
 226 O’Brien, supra note 221, at 694. 
 227 Craig Willse, “‘Universal Data Elements,’ or the Biopolitical Life of 
Homeless Populations,” 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC. 227, 245 (2008). 
 228 Id. (“The population is a living entity injected with biopolitical force that 
acts back upon that which made it.”). 
 229 Id. (noting that the agencies are using the data to secure funding and HUD 
approval, rather than to improve services). 
 230 Id. at 248. 
 231 See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding no 
constitutional violation when juvenile social histories were shared with fifty-five 
different social, governmental, and religious agencies). 
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even with adherence to the Golden Rule, poor people would still 
suffer the stigmatization and humiliation that occur when 
information is collected because statutes do not generally 
address this phase of information transfer. 
2. Federal and State Privacy Statutes 
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the primary statute 
regulating how federal government agencies manage 
information about individuals.232 In 1998, the Act was extended 
to “computer matching,” which occurs when federal and state 
agencies compare data about individuals.233 TANF applicants 
are subject to extensive computer matching. The Privacy Act 
requires, among other things, that individuals subject to 
matching have opportunities to receive notice and to refute 
adverse information when benefits are denied or terminated.234 
As a result, when an applicant applies for TANF, she should 
receive notice that the state agency may be obtaining and 
matching federal records to verify her eligibility information.  
The Act’s protections are detailed and elaborate, but 
offer limited protection for welfare applicants. To begin with, 
the Privacy Act is focused on protecting information from 
governmental misuse once it is gathered. It does not focus on 
the methods or forms of collection, which in the welfare system 
are demeaning and stigmatizing. Further, the Act’s requirements 
of notice and consent are generally meaningless, because on 
welfare applications these provisions usually contain difficult to 
understand jargon hidden among the reams of information and 
questions contained in the forms.235 Finally, the Privacy Act does 
not govern the massive amounts of personal information held 
by state and local agencies, and statutory protections at this 
level diverge widely.236  
There are other federal privacy laws that are concerned 
with protecting individuals from the disclosure of personal 
information that could be embarrassing if revealed to the 
  
 232 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006). 
 233 The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-503, amended the Privacy Act to add several new provisions. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (2000). 
 234 See Brown, supra note 58, at 428-29 (describing requirements of Privacy 
Act as they apply to TANF applicants). Brown also discusses important privacy issues 
surrounding immigration status. Id. at 430-32. 
 235 Id. at 428. 
 236 Schwartz, supra note 213, at 916-18 (discussing state statutes addressing 
privacy).  
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public. Thus, there are statutes that protect against disclosure 
of credit histories, student records, debts, bank records, tax 
returns, television viewing habits, health information, and (as 
discussed above) video rentals.237 Obviously, Americans from 
every social class benefit from these protections. Still, this bevy 
of statutes does not protect anyone from the embarrassment 
that occurs when the government or private entities gather 
information in an intrusive or demeaning manner in the first 
place. This mistreatment tends to happen disproportionately to 
the poor and other marginalized groups. Yet another group of 
statutes protects individuals from unwanted intrusion into 
their private affairs, including laws that limit hacking and 
unsolicited e-mails and that create do-not-call registries.238 
Again, these statutes erect a wall; they do not mediate ongoing 
relationships between individuals and the government or 
corporations. As such, these statutes are not models for 
reconsidering surveillance of the poor.  
Neither are employment laws. In our at-will system of 
employment, private employers face few restraints in monitoring 
their employees.239 Although employee monitoring is a subject 
for collective bargaining for those employees who are members 
of unions, this is an ever-decreasing share of the workforce.240 
While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
prohibits the interception of data transmitted by electronic 
means, it is riddled with exceptions that essentially take 
private employers out of its reach.241 As a result, companies can 
  
 237 See Scot Ganow & Sam S. Han, Model Omnibus Privacy Statute, 35 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 345, 349-58 (2010) (listing federal privacy statutes). 
 238 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008) (criminalizing unauthorized access to a 
computer); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), (f) (2005) (creating Do-Not-Call Registry); Junk 
Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (amending 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227) (regulating unsolicited faxes); Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 
(regulating unsolicited commercial e-mails). 
 239 O’Gorman, supra note 27, at 217-18. Some notable exceptions are laws 
prohibiting lie detector tests as a condition of employment and laws limiting employers 
from making employment decisions based on arrest records that disproportionately 
impact minorities. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY 
41 (2003). Employers are also subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act if they conduct 
background credit checks of applicants or employees. Id.  
 240 Video surveillance, physical examinations, drug and alcohol testing, and 
polygraph testing are all mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the NLRA, 
and notice must be provided. Alexandra Fiore, Note, Undignified in Defeat: An 
Analysis of the Stagnation and Demise of Proposed Legislation Limiting Video 
Surveillance in the Workplace and Suggestions for Change, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 525, 540-41 (2008). Penalties for employers, however, are merely a “slap on the 
wrist.” Id. at 542. 
 241 Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity? Electronic Monitoring in the 
Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 401-03 (2000).  
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monitor their employees as they work on computers or engage 
in phone calls. Over the years, Congress and state legislatures 
have considered bills that would limit employer surveillance 
by, for instance, giving employees greater notice of when they 
were being monitored or limiting monitoring of long-term 
employees, but none has passed.242 This lack of statutory 
protections falls hardest on low-wage employees who are 
monitored most extensively.243 
C. The Common Law  
The entire body of privacy law emerged from the 
common law, largely as a result of a path-breaking law review 
article written in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis 
called The Right to Privacy which articulated a “right to be let 
alone.”244 Concerned about an overzealous and sensationalistic 
press coupled with instantaneous photography,245 Warren and 
Brandeis asserted that the “common law secures to each 
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent 
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated 
to others.”246 This new conception of privacy influenced state 
courts to recognize a common law right to privacy, and by the 
mid-twentieth century most states recognized four distinct 
privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure 
of embarrassing private facts, (3) publicity that places a person 
in a false light in the public eye, and (4) commercial 
appropriation of a person’s name or likeness.247  
As few poor people are celebrities, the most relevant tort 
for this discussion is the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which 
protects an individual from intrusion upon his “solitude or 
seclusion . . . or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the 
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”248 
  
 242 Id. at 409-10.  
 243 Even public employees have limited protections because private 
employment law concepts have seeped into the constitutional analysis such that there 
is not much of a difference. Id. at 400; Sprague, supra note 135, at 114 (“Both the 
constitutional and common law rights to privacy require an underlying expectation of 
privacy; so, in this regard, the analysis is the same in both the public and private 
employment scenario.”). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment “does not address questions 
of the intensity or impersonality of the surveillance.” Rothstein, supra note 241, at 401. 
 244 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
 245 Sprague, supra note 135, at 98. 
 246 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 244, at 198. 
 247 See Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
2012] THE CLASS DIFFERENTIAL IN PRIVACY LAW 1425 
Employees have occasionally been successful in asserting this 
tort against highly offensive privacy violations committed by 
employers, such as video surveillance of bathrooms and locker 
rooms.249 Being videotaped covertly while engaged in private 
acts is distressing and causes psychological trauma.250 Of 
course, this sort of conduct occurs disproportionately in low-
wage workplaces,251 and most of it is never the subject of legal 
action.252 In addition, overt employer monitoring is not 
actionable because employees usually consent to it as a 
condition of employment.253 If employees refuse consent, they 
protect their privacy but lose their jobs.  
Moreover, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion is 
essentially impotent against electronic monitoring. As one 
court summarized,  
When courts have considered claims in the workplace, they have 
generally found for the plaintiffs only if the challenged intrusions 
involved information or activities of a highly intimate 
nature. . . . Where the intrusions have merely involved unwanted 
access to data or activities related to the workplace, however, claims 
of intrusion have failed.254  
Today, electronic monitoring by employers includes keystroke 
loggers that trace every key pressed on a keyboard, phone 
monitoring, and video surveillance, as well as smart ID cards 
and GPS enabled cell phones and vehicles that track employee 
movements.255 
Tort challenges to these practices usually fail because 
the tort protects only reasonable expectations of privacy (thus 
mirroring Fourth Amendment standards).256 Under the 
common law, it is not reasonable to expect privacy in a public 
  
 249 Fiore, supra note 240, at 547 (“It is extremely difficult for an employee to 
succeed on an intrusion claim in all but the most egregious circumstances.”). 
 250 Robert I. Simon, Video Voyeurs and the Covert Videotaping of Unsuspecting 
Victims: Psychological and Legal Consequences, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 884, 884 (1997). 
 251 NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., PRIVACY UNDER SIEGE: ELECTRONIC 
MONITORING IN THE WORKPLACE, available at http://epic.org/privacy/workplace/e-
monitoring.pdf (listing reports of intrusive video surveillance, many of which occur in 
the service industry and manufacturing plants). 
 252 At least three states have codified this common law protection and ban video 
recordings in locker rooms and restrooms and the like. See Fiore, supra note 240, at 543. 
 253 See Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: 
How to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 517, 570 (2001).  
 254 Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 
(D. Ariz. 1998), aff’d, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 
 255 See Sprague, supra note 135, at 84-85; William R. Corbett, The Need for a 
Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 103-04 (2003). 
 256 See Corbett, supra note 255, at 110; O’Gorman, supra note 27, at 227-30. 
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context, and the workplace is considered public.257 Even if an 
employee can demonstrate a cognizable privacy interest, the 
courts then proceed to balance employee and employer 
interests⎯a test employees rarely win because their injuries 
are considered isolated and individualized.258 While all 
employees face these common law limitations, the privacy 
intrusions for white collar workers are less visible and less 
humiliating. This may in part explain the lack of public outrage 
over employer monitoring.  
The limits of the common law for securing privacy for 
the poor can be traced to its roots. The right to be left alone was 
conceived to protect society’s elites (such as Warren and 
Brandeis) from the glare of public scrutiny.259 It was grounded 
in property law conceptions; people “own” their own identity 
and should be able to decide how they present themselves to 
the world.260 In the United States, “[p]rivacy is territorial and is 
seen as a possessive right that may be alienated preemptively 
and wholesale.”261 Once you enter the workplace or ask for 
governmental assistance, you leave that right at the door.262  
Notably, at the time Brandeis and Warren wrote their 
article, the poor were subject to “scientific charity,” a movement 
that relied on middle-class “friendly visitors” to enter the homes 
of the poor and to provide them moral and religious 
counseling.263 Prior to the scientific charity movement, the 
eighteenth-century poor were warehoused in poorhouses, which 
required “the poor to live within the walls of a total institution, 
often in uniform, and under strict rules of behavior and 
mandates of forced labor.”264 In the colonial era, the poor were 
  
 257 O’Gorman, supra note 27, at 237 (“[A]ctivities that are work-related are 
generally not considered private vis-á-vis one’s employer.”). 
 258 Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Common Law & Federal Statutory 
Protection, NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., http://workrights.us/?products=electronic-monitoring-
in-the-workplace-common-law-federal-statutory-protection (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).  
 259 Warren and Brandeis bemoaned the “idle gossip” of the daily papers and 
the resultant “mental and pain and distress” suffered by the subjects. Brandeis was 
eventually a Supreme Court justice, while Warren was a wealthy lawyer about whom 
stories appeared in the local press. SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 213, at 10-11. 
 260 Courts have interpreted privacy as a component of property, but a 
countervailing narrative asserts that Warren and Brandeis understood that privacy 
derived from “inviolate personality,” meaning “the individual’s independence, dignity, and 
integrity.” Rothstein, supra note 241, at 407 (quoting Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an 
Aspect of Human Dignity, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 6, 
163 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 261 Id. at 382.  
 262 Id. 
 263 See TRATTNER, supra note 182, at 67-68; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW 
OF THE POORHOUSE 70 (10th ed. 1996).  
 264 GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 24. 
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often bound out as servants to wealthier members of the 
community.265 Today, as explained supra, the welfare system 
continues to control the lives of poor mothers. Simply put, there 
has never been a historical conception of privacy for the poor. 
Surveillance has always been the government’s prerogative and a 
tool for social control. Thus, the common law right to be let alone is 
of little use to people who rely on public assistance for survival and 
who navigate an ongoing relationship with government officials 
and/or corporations.  
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY AND POVERTY 
The legal system provides scant privacy protections for 
the poor. Our body of privacy law is built upon the “right to be 
left alone,” which ill-fits the nature of the intertwined 
relationships between poor people and larger institutional actors. 
The idea of being left alone creates a class differential that 
shelters those who can afford it. The result is that the poor are 
often subject to humiliating and stigmatizing data collection 
practices. This raises the question of how the law can better 
equalize privacy among all citizens. This part explores various 
remedies for the class differential in privacy law and policy. First, 
it examines and rejects nonlegal solutions such as improved 
“customer” relations, on the one end, and increased automation, on 
the other. Then, this part explores other values that give meaning 
to privacy. Privacy is not an end to itself; rather, it fosters and 
furthers other values. Accordingly, this part suggests how norms 
of dignity, respect, and trust⎯as articulated by criminal-justice 
scholars⎯can enhance privacy for the poor in the civil realm. 
While each of these approaches has limitations, they provide 
valuable guideposts for reconceptualizing privacy for the poor.  
A. Nonlegal Solutions 
1. Service with a Smile 
One optimistic, but ultimately infeasible, solution is to 
make interactions between low-income people and larger 
institutions more pleasant and less humiliating. Indeed, some 
welfare offices have policies that encourage caseworkers to 
treat “clients” with respect. Still, it is difficult to mandate 
  
 265 See William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial 
America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 55 (1996). 
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politeness and questionable whether new rights-based regimes 
are desirable or effective, especially with populations that do 
not view themselves as rights-bearing individuals.  
Susan Bennett has articulated how and why welfare 
bureaucracies use privacy-stripping tactics to discourage poor 
people from applying for assistance, with devastating 
consequences for the needy.266 Churned out of public 
bureaucracies, the poor suffer hunger and homelessness, as 
well as a “dampening of the spirit, a lowering of expectations of 
any kind of fair treatment.”267 In her study of a waiting room at the 
District of Columbia’s Office of Emergency Shelter and Support 
Services, she found an “ethos of undisclosed information, 
unexplained delays, and, above all, endless waiting, punctuated by 
humiliating demands for information.”268 This ethos arose from a 
variety of factors, such as a vague regulatory regime that 
permitted workers to demand extreme forms of proof;269 the front-
line workers’ fear of “being spare-changed” and distrust of 
applicants;270 bureaucratic pressures to prevent the needy from 
filing applications so as to reduce welfare rolls and avoid providing 
due process protections;271 “external demands for fraud control,”272 
and an inability to cope with rising demand in the face of 
decreasing resources and reduced staffing.273 In this environment, 
norms of “customer service” seem laughably optimistic.  
On the employment side, low-wage workers experience a 
different workplace than white collar workers. They usually 
lack employment benefits such as health insurance or 
retirement accounts. They face inflexible or unpredictable work 
hours that limit access to child care and transportation. They 
have few opportunities for career advancement. They are more 
likely to work in unsafe or unhealthy conditions.274 They also 
have less privacy. These features of the low-income workforce 
are deeply structural, and require far more change than an 
attitude adjustment. As David Yamada explains, employment 
  
 266 See generally Susan D. Bennett, “No Relief but Upon the Terms of Coming 
into the House”—Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an 
Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157 (1995). 
 267 Id. at 2182.  
 268 Id. at 2158.  
 269 Id. at 2187. 
 270 Id. at 2188. 
 271 Id. at 2193-94. 
 272 Id. at 2194. 
 273 Id. at 2198-99. 
 274 See HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LOW-WAGE WORK IN THE 
UNITED STATES 9-10 (2007), available at http://www.inclusionist.org/files/ 
lowwagework.pdf.  
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law “cannot force organizations to care about the health and 
well-being of their employees, require workers to vote for union 
representation, or simply order everyone to be ‘nice’ to one 
another.”275 And even if the law could mandate politeness, the 
stigma of surveillance would stick. The sweetest social worker 
in the world might search your medicine cabinets with a smile. 
An employer may hand over a cup for a urine test with a polite 
request. The effect is still demeaning.  
2. Automation 
In lieu of mandated courtesy, it might be tempting to 
move in the opposite direction and limit interpersonal 
interaction between low-income Americans and larger 
institutional actors. Arguably, the more things are automated, 
the less opportunity there is for insult. Supporters of automation 
promote technology as a way to save money and ensure 
consistent decisions.276 However, as Danielle Citron explains, 
automation can and does fail.277  
To begin with, computer programmers struggle to 
properly translate complex public benefits programs into code, 
resulting in violations of federal and state law.278 For instance, 
Citron describes how programmers in Colorado incorrectly 
coded nine hundred different public benefits rules into an 
automated system, resulting in people wrongfully losing food 
stamps and Medicaid.279 Furthermore, computers are not fail-
safe; they “misidentify individuals [with] . . . same or similar 
names,”280 send faulty notices, and terminate benefits without 
warning.281 At the same time, many computer programs fail to 
maintain audit trails of decisions, which then make it 
impossible for individuals to challenge automated decisions in 
due process hearings.  
At due process hearings, hearing officers are biased in 
favor of automated systems, with their veneer of objectivity and 
  
 275 David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 523, 554 (2009). Yamada notes, however, that the law can help workers 
by “safeguarding the rights of association and collective bargaining.” Id. 
 276 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1252-53 (2008). 
 277 Id. at 1256-58 (listing examples of automation failures). 
 278 Id. at 1267-68.  
 279 Id. at 1268, 1271-72.  
 280 Id. at 1273. 
 281 Id. at 1275-76; see also Willse, supra note 227, at 240 (discussing homeless 
information management systems and stating that “database programs of course also 
fall short or fail—systems crash, networks go down, files get mysteriously deleted”). 
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correctness, and laypersons are hard-pressed to challenge the 
source code underlying automated programs.282 The end result 
is that computer programmers are, in effect, rewriting 
regulations without notice and comment.283 Automation can 
also be dehumanizing. As Virginia Eubanks writes, “the 
structure of technological systems erase the embodied contexts 
and knowledge of the people described in them.”284  
Even if the errors inherent in automation could be 
erased, the poor would likely still face differential treatment. 
Consider the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).285 The EITC, 
enacted in 1975, provides low-income, working Americans with 
a refundable tax credit, which amounted to as much as $5666 
in 2010, depending on family size.286 The program lifts five 
million families above the poverty line each year.287 The 
program has significantly increased employment among single 
mothers and simultaneously lowered the receipt of welfare cash 
assistance.288 Notably, the tax credit is granted via an 
“impersonal and invisible process” that is far less demeaning 
than public benefits programs.289  
Nevertheless, low-income taxpayers claiming the EITC 
receive far greater scrutiny than middle-class taxpayers.290 
They are audited at higher rates,291 even though over two-
thirds of audited EITC claims are ultimately found to be 
proper.292 The IRS believes that the EITC has a high 
  
 282 Citron, supra note 276, at 1283-84. 
 283 Id. at 1288.  
 284 Eubanks, supra note 49, at 99. 
 285 I.R.C. § 32 (2008). 
 286 EITC—Don’t Overlook It, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=106429,00.html.  
 287 Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 790, 792 (2007). Brown notes, “More children are lifted out of poverty as a result 
of the credit than any other governmental program.” Id. 
 288 Id. at 799-800.  
 289 Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2007). 
 290 “No other taxpayers are subject to such scrutiny.” Brown, supra note 287, 
at 791-92.  
 291 EITC audits “comprise roughly 36 percent of all individual taxpayer 
audits.” Kate Leifeld, Creating Access to Tax Benefits: How Pro Bono Tax Professionals 
Can Help Low-Income Taxpayers Claim the Earned Income Tax Credit, 62 ME. L. REV. 
543, 544 (2010). 
 292 See Brown, supra note 287, at 791. The government focuses disproportionate 
time and energy on EITC audits—since 1998, the IRS has poured over $1 billion into 
EITC audits. See id. at 792. However, the data shows that audits of wealthier taxpayers 
are far more productive. See id. at 808 (these audits “generally result in at least four 
times the recommended additional tax than audits of low-income taxpayers”).  
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overpayment rate due to fraud,293 but studies show that the 
vast majority of errors result from other, unintentional factors 
such as the “notoriously confusing” complexities of the 
program,294 the turnover as claimants move in and out of 
poverty,295 low literacy rates among low-income taxpayers,296 a 
lack of access to professional tax preparers, and a fear of 
turning over personal information to the government.297 
Due to the distrust of EITC taxpayers, the IRS rolled 
out a precertification process between 2003 and 2005 among 
selected portions of the EITC population, which required 
claimants to provide third party affidavits and documentation 
in support of their EITC tax filings.298 By contrast, the rest of 
the tax system relies on self-reporting. Thus, critics of the 
precertification process charged that this differential treatment 
for low-income filers was unfair and unduly burdensome.299  
Dorothy Brown explains the discrepancy in audit rates 
and filing requirements for the poor.300 She states that 
politicians publicly equate the EITC with welfare, thus 
knowingly triggering racialized welfare stereotypes in which, 
“low-income taxpayers are viewed as lazy former welfare 
recipients who . . . will lie and cheat in order to line their 
pockets with government money.”301 By contrast, “government 
subsidies that flow to predominantly white beneficiaries are 
not considered to constitute welfare,” such as farm subsidies.302 
Ironically, most EITC recipients are white,303 which means the 
racial stereotypes harm all EITC-eligible taxpayers. EITC 
enforcement shows that perceptions of class and race lead to 
differential treatment even in programs that involve little face-
to-face interaction. Automation alone is not the answer. 
  
 293 See Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit 
Compliance and Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 185 (2007).  
 294 Leifeld, supra note 291, at 547. “[T]he IRS publication associated with the 
[EITC] is over fifty pages long with six separate worksheets.” Brown, supra note 287, at 792. 
 295 See Leifeld, supra note 291, at 547 (stating that the “pool of taxpayers who 
claim the EITC is constantly changing”).  
 296 See Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in 
the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351, 396-97 (2002). 
 297 See Leifeld, supra note 291, at 550. 
 298 See Brown, supra note 287, at 809-10. 
 299 See, e.g., id. (explaining that “[n]o other tax provision requires 
precertification, while all welfare-type programs require it”). 
 300 Id. at 799-810. 
 301 Id. at 793-95. 
 302 Id. at 814  
 303 Id. at 820. 
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B. Giving Content to Privacy Under Law 
Privacy is not an end to itself; it supports and enhances 
other important values. Accordingly, enhancing the 
relationship between the poor and larger institutions requires 
more than leaving the poor alone. In related contexts, scholars 
have been working to shape a richer conception of privacy, 
particularly under the Fourth Amendment as it relates to 
criminal searches. Frustrated with the malleable reasonableness 
standard and its failure to restrain government surveillance, 
these scholars have strived to give content to the meaning of 
privacy. These approaches, developed mostly in the criminal law 
context, are helpful in considering the welfare-to-work 
continuum because they focus on the individual’s relationship to 
the state. They are also relevant because welfare has become 
increasingly criminalized, and because criminal law 
jurisprudence most impacts poor communities. These theories 
focus on dignity, respect, and trust as values secured by privacy. 
Privacy is not an end to itself; rather, it secures higher values.  
To be sure, there is a tension between seeking 
governmental assistance and simultaneously demanding privacy 
from the state.304 Yet wealthier Americans would recoil in horror 
if the government put them through similar scrutiny as a 
condition of receiving governmental subsidies, such as tax 
deductions for mortgages and retirement plans, and childcare 
tax credits.305 Moreover, poor people do not need to be “left alone” 
by the state or employer to benefit from privacy. Rather, the 
advantage of the dignity-respect-trust models discussed below is 
that they can accommodate intertwined relationships in a way 
that privacy has not been able to bear. In the end, surveillance 
needs to be proportional to its purposes. The goal is not to shut 
out the state or employers, but to make them partners with low-
income Americans in a flourishing democracy.  
  
 304 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional 
Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 940 (1995). 
 305 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 191 (1995) (“[M]iddle-class 
families benefit from extensive entitlement programs, be they FHA or VA loans at 
below mortgage market rates or employer health and life insurance. These families 
receive untaxed benefits as direct subsidies.”).  
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1. Dignity 
John Castiglione argues that dignity is an equally 
important Fourth Amendment value as privacy.306 As he points 
out, under the reasonableness standard’s balancing test, it is 
almost impossible for an individual’s “abstract, indeterminate”307 
privacy interest to outweigh the state’s concrete interest in law 
enforcement and social control.308 Accordingly, he posits that 
dignity can support the scaffolding of the Fourth Amendment in a 
way that privacy cannot.309 He notes, people (such as prisoners) 
can completely lack privacy but still claim “a legitimate 
expectation of being treated with dignity.”310 In philosophical 
terms, dignity is the “right to be treated as an end, not as a 
means.”311 In practical terms, it is the opposite of “unnecessarily 
degrading, humiliating, or dehumanizing government behavior.”312 
In legal terms, the Supreme Court often uses the concept of 
dignity to inform constitutional interpretation, so it is recognized 
as a constitutional commitment even if rarely enforced in the 
Fourth Amendment context.313 Castiglione helpfully contrasts 
privacy, which protects access to the self, with dignity, which 
“generally concerns a limitation on the manner in which an 
individual is interacted with.”314 Under his proposal, 
government searches and seizures would be unlawful if they 
degrade or humiliate individuals without a sufficient 
countervailing law enforcement interest.315  
Similarly, David Yamada has posited that dignity 
should replace “markets and management” as the framework 
for American employment law.316 The current employment law 
regime is dominated “by a belief system that embraces the idea 
of unfettered free markets and regards limitations on 
  
 306 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 
WIS. L. REV. 655, 655. 
 307 Id. at 664. 
 308 Id. at 660. 
 309 Id. at 674-75. 
 310 Id. at 675. 
 311 Id. at 678. 
 312 Id. at 687. 
 313 Id. at 680-81. See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of 
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (setting forth a typology of how the Supreme 
Court uses dignity). 
 314 Castiglione, supra note 306, at 688-89.  
 315 Id. at 696. 
 316 Yamada, supra note 275, at 524. See generally RANDY HODSON, DIGNITY AT 
WORK (2001) (describing threats to dignity in the workplace). 
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management authority with deep suspicion.”317 Yet this 
framework benefits the rich at the expense of the poor, as 
income inequality grows and workers face increasing job 
insecurity, stress, and negative health consequences⎯all 
without adequate legal recourse.318 At the same time, the law 
fails to protect against humiliation “by having a remedial 
structure that is arbitrary, expensive, and difficult.”319 By 
contrast, a dignitary conception of the workplace would, among 
other things, support unions and collective bargaining “as an 
invaluable source of countervailing power in society,” because 
they give workers a voice as well as leverage to demand a better 
workplace.320 Notably, collective bargaining is one of the few 
ways in our system to limit employer surveillance. Although 
low-wage workers often do find dignity in their work, they do so 
in spite of the law.321 
Other authors have contrasted the American system⎯in 
which “dignity is denied by treating the employee as a mere factor 
of production . . . and ignoring . . . the worker’s individuality”⎯to 
European workplace law, which emphasizes dignity and sharply 
limits surveillance.322 In Europe, dignity is connected to “notions 
of community and citizenship [rather] than property.”323 Under 
this conception, private power is seen as great a threat to dignity 
as public power.324 Thus, privacy is considered a fundamental 
human right.325 For instance, workers in France have a say in 
when and how employer monitoring occurs, they have the right 
to be informed about the automated treatment of their personal 
  
 317 Yamada, supra note 275, at 523; see also RICHARD SENNETT, THE 
CORROSION OF CHARACTER 31 (1998) (describing how the “new capitalism” emphasis on 
flexibility “loosens bonds of trust and commitment, and divorces will from behavior”). 
Sennett writes that information systems “give individuals anywhere in the network 
little room to hide.” Id. at 55.  
 318 Yamada, supra note 275, at 530-31.  
 319 Fisk, supra note 133, at 92.  
 320 Moreover, unions are particularly important in the low-wage workforce, 
where exploitation is rampant. Yamada, supra note 275, at 557. Dignitary norms 
would also provide protections against unjust or unfair dismissal, id. at 558-61, limit 
workplace bullying, id. at 562-65, and improve dispute resolution procedures for 
employment-related conflicts, id. at 566. 
 321 See, e.g., Clare L. Stacey, Finding Dignity in Dirty Work: The Constraints 
and Rewards of Low-Wage Home Care Labour, 27 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 831, 832 
(2005) (“[A]ides import dignity into a stigmatised and relatively invisible occupation.”). 
 322 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 383-84. Cf. James Q. Whitman, The Two 
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161-62 
(2004) (comparing European privacy norms, which are rooted in notions of personal 
honor, with American privacy law, which is rooted in notions of liberty). 
 323 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 383; Nehf, supra note 1, at 81-82. 
 324 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 386. 
 325 Nehf, supra note 1, at 81-82. 
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information, they receive notice about the scope of monitoring, 
and monitoring must be proportional to the employers’ 
objectives.326 Reforming privacy to reflect dignitary values could 
be helpful to low-income Americans because dignity is an 
inviolable, core human right that cannot be bought or sold by 
those with more access to wealth. At the same time, the 
individual emphasis on dignity can obscure the class-based 
motivations for and consequences of surveillance. 
2. Respect 
Andrew Taslitz suggests a class-conscious approach that 
hinges upon respect as a central value underlying privacy.327 He 
explains that courts envision the “reasonable person” interacting 
with the police from the perspective of a white middle-class 
person “rather than the poor person familiar with police 
abuse.”328 Taslitz is particularly attuned to the disparate impact 
of current Fourth Amendment doctrine on racial minorities 
entangled in the criminal justice system.329 As he defines 
respect, it “is also about inclusion, about being considered full 
members of the wider political community.”330 He explains how 
a lack of governmental respect impacts communities, which 
suffer when they are targeted for suspicionless searches.331 
Those searches “send a message to their victims that they are 
unworthy of the government’s respect.”332 Accordingly, he urges 
courts to expand their perspectives to better understand and 
acknowledge minority group experiences.333 This idea of respect 
would be helpful in shaping the experiences of low-income 
Americans as they interact with welfare offices and low-wage 
employers. Under his conception of respect, courts would have to 
consider both the impact of privacy law from the perspective of 
those under surveillance as well as the costs to civil society and 
  
 326 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 387-90; see also William A. Herbert, 
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democratic participation when entire groups are demeaned and 
subordinated.  
The challenge to this approach is that the poor have 
long been deemed undeserving of respect. The majority of 
Americans believe that this country is a meritocracy, by which 
anyone can lift themselves up by their bootstraps. This myth 
leads to cultural explanations for poverty that blame the poor 
for their own predicament.334 
As I have explained elsewhere, the cultural explanation 
of poverty is founded on conjecture masquerading as common 
sense, but has no empirical support.335 Nevertheless, it has had 
remarkable staying power because it demands less from 
government and it appeals to the economically insecure middle 
class.336 By contrast, the real causes of poverty are far more 
complex. An amalgamation of economic and demographic 
factors contribute to poverty, including declining labor market 
opportunities, the erosion of the minimum wage and low-wage 
income, deindustrialization, technological changes in the 
economy, globalization, the decline of unions, and the increased 
use of contingent workers who are low-wage, part-time, and 
lack benefits.337 In addition, governmental urban policies have 
segregated poor minority communities into areas of concentrated 
poverty.338 Nevertheless, the entrenched myth of the meritocracy 
makes it difficult to build a legal theory around respect. 
3. Trust  
Scott Sundby is similarly dismayed by the Fourth 
Amendment balancing test, and he advances a reciprocal 
government-citizen trust model under which the government 
could not “intrude into the citizenry’s lives without a finding 
that the citizenry has forfeited society’s trust to exercise its 
  
 334 See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 25, at 159-61 (describing culture of 
poverty theories). 
 335 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 320 (2008) (“In the 
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 336 See Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some 
of the Time: 1990’s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. 
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 337 See id. at 66-72; ICELAND, supra note 40, at 77-78; see also MICHAEL B. 
KATZ, IMPROVING POOR PEOPLE: THE WELFARE STATE, THE “UNDERCLASS,” AND URBAN 
SCHOOLS AS HISTORY 77-78 (1997); Joel Handler, “Ending Welfare as We Know It”—
Wrong for Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 10-12 (1994). 
 338 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
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freedoms responsibly.”339 In other words, citizens would not be 
searched unless they did something to raise suspicion of 
wrongdoing. His citizen-trust model applies most appropriately 
to situations in which the state initiates an intrusion into 
individual privacy (as is the case with public benefits regimes) 
rather than responds to perceived wrongdoing.340 This model 
recognizes that “[g]overnment action draws its legitimacy from 
the trust that the electorate places in its representatives by 
choosing them to govern.”341 Right now, poor Americans do not 
feel “they have the opportunities and capabilities to participate 
meaningfully in society,” in part due to privacy invasions that 
signal a lack of trust by government. “Rights are not simply 
enclaves of protection from government interference but also 
affect the citizen’s view of his or her role in society.”342  
Unfortunately, welfare mothers and low-wage workers 
have almost no conception of rights⎯they are “the inverse of 
the rights-bearing individual.”343 Moreover, a citizenship based 
approach to privacy does not extend to the private market, 
which often has just as much power over individuals as does 
the state. Nor does it protect noncitizens, who are nevertheless 
entitled to the human right of dignity. Finally, poor people who 
are citizens are often excluded from mainstream norms of 
citizenship. As Dorothy Roberts explains, the welfare system 
treats its recipients as subjects rather than citizens for reasons 
of class, gender, and race.344 Whereas citizens receive 
government benefits such as social security as an entitlement 
free of stigma, subjects “receive inferior, inadequate, and 
stigmatizing relief at the government’s discretion.”345 She 
concludes, “While welfare for citizens enables them to be self-
ruling persons, welfare for subjects enables the government to 
rule them.”346 Until our conception of citizenship includes the 
poor, a citizen-trust model may not advance their privacy.  
  
 339 Sundby, supra note 154, at 1777.  
 340 Id. at 1787. 
 341 Id. at 1777. 
 342 Id. at 1784. 
 343 GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 91.  
 344 Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 
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C. The Fragile Nature of Privacy 
All three of these models⎯dignity, respect, and 
trust⎯add to our understanding of why privacy is valuable, 
particularly for our most vulnerable citizens. Adoption of any of 
these theories could transform the experiences of poor citizens as 
they interact with the state and their employers. Nevertheless, 
the courts appear reluctant to weave these strands into privacy 
jurisprudence, even when courts rule in favor of privacy.  
Consider Ferguson v. City of Charleston,347 in which the 
Supreme Court used the Fourth Amendment to strike down a 
public hospital’s policy (created in conjunction with local police 
and prosecutors) of drug testing poor, pregnant patients 
suspected of using drugs.348 The hospital implemented the policy 
in the wake of a perceived crack epidemic in which thousands of 
babies were reportedly being born to drug addicted mothers.349 
Under the policy, patients who tested positive were referred to 
substance abuse treatment programs under the threat of arrest 
if they did not comply or if they tested positive in a subsequent 
screening.350 The policy was enforced only in the hospital’s 
Medicaid maternity clinic; it was not used in other hospital 
departments or for pregnant women who paid for their care.351 
The class, race, and gender differential in privacy was clear. 
The Court first ruled that the urine tests constituted 
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.352 As 
the Court stated, “The reasonable expectation of privacy 
enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a 
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared 
with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”353 Further, 
prior cases approving drug testing involved a special need 
disconnected from law enforcement.354 By contrast, in Ferguson, 
“the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its 
inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients 
into substance abuse treatment.”355  
  
 347 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 348 Id. at 70-73. 
 349 Id. at 70 n.1. 
 350 Id. at 71-72. 
 351 Campbell, supra note 91, at 69; Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth 
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While the hospital argued that it had identified criteria 
that raised suspicion of cocaine use, the Court found no 
evidence in the record “that any of the nine search criteria was 
more apt to be caused by cocaine use than by some other factor, 
such as malnutrition, illness, or indigency.”356 In so doing, the 
Court implicitly recognized the harmful effects of poverty and 
refused to punish the mothers for being poor. Thus, the positive 
narrative of Ferguson is that it took into “account the experiences 
and values of women,” and “gave patient and parental autonomy 
great weight” in a manner that “was offended by paternalistic 
notions.”357 The Court appraised the context of the searches, 
recognized the stigma that attached to the women who were drug 
tested, and limited the criminalization of poverty. 
However, the real-life impact of Ferguson remains limited. 
The Court’s holding hinges entirely upon its disapproval of police 
involvement in crafting and enforcing the hospital’s policy; at no 
time does the Court articulate any values underlying the patients’ 
claim for privacy. This absence increases the difficulty of 
stretching Ferguson to cases lacking police involvement, as the 
Court seemed to intend with its narrow holding.  
Thus, the scrutiny of the lives of poor, pregnant women 
remains. In her ethnographic study, Khiara Bridges describes 
how poor, pregnant patients seeking Medicaid coverage for 
prenatal health care costs are subject to mandatory interviews 
that probe the most intimate corners of their lives.358 The 
information gathered goes far beyond what wealthier pregnant 
women are expected to divulge to their doctors: it involves 
detailed assessments regarding nutrition, psycho-social factors, 
and finances conducted by a range of nurses, social workers, 
and other professionals.359 The women receive education about 
contraceptive options throughout their pregnancies and access to 
long-acting contraception following the birth of their babies.360 
As a result, the state has “all the information necessary to sweep 
poor families within the ambit of child protective services, the 
foster care system, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and, 
if deemed necessary, the criminal justice system.”361  
  
 356 Id. at 77 n.10. 
 357 Taslitz, supra note 351, at 3. 
 358 Bridges, supra note 52, at 113, 114. 
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Moreover, Ferguson does not change the fact that many 
states criminally and civilly penalize a woman’s drug use during 
pregnancy.362 In addition, at least three states have mandatory 
drug testing of pregnant women in some circumstances.363 One of 
the harshest state statutes is in South Carolina, where the 
Ferguson case originated. In South Carolina, a positive drug test 
at the time of birth results in a presumption of parental neglect 
that warrants removal of a child from the mother’s custody.364 
South Carolina also stands alone in approving criminal 
prosecutions of women who have used drugs during pregnancy. 
Although an estimated two hundred women with drug 
addictions have been criminally prosecuted in thirty states for 
fetal abuse,365 most appellate courts have overturned those 
convictions. In South Carolina, by contrast, the state Supreme 
Court held that “fetuses are ‘person[s]’ under the state’s criminal 
child endangerment statute,”366 and affirmed the conviction of a 
mother who had used cocaine during her pregnancy. Not 
surprisingly, drug treatment programs in South Carolina have 
seen their admissions of pregnant women drop, infant 
mortality rates have risen, and there has been a 20 percent 
increase in abandoned babies.367 Without a value-driven 
approach to privacy, the class differential in privacy policies is 
likely to continue. Dignity, respect, and trust are values that 
can inform privacy law and policy. 
IV. EQUALITY IN PRIVACY LAW 
As Ferguson demonstrates, the courts do not explicitly 
equate spatial or informational privacy with the values of 
dignity, respect, or trust, even though these principles would 
provide meaningful guideposts to distinguishing appropriate 
  
 362 See Lynn M. Paltrow, Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use 
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data collection from demeaning surveillance.368 Interestingly 
however, there is one consistent strain in privacy cases that 
emerges over the years: class equality. In his Wyman dissent in 
1971 (upholding welfare home searches), Justice Douglas 
pointed out the class differential in privacy law, stating, “No 
such sums are spent policing the government subsidies granted 
to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, and junk mail 
dealers, to name but a few.”369 Over thirty years later, the 
dissenting judge in Sanchez v. San Diego (a modern welfare 
home visit case) wryly pointed out, “I doubt my colleagues in 
the majority would disagree that an IRS auditor’s asking to 
look in [‘medicine cabinets, laundry baskets, closets and 
drawers for evidence of welfare fraud’] within their own homes 
to verify the number of dependents living at home would 
constitute snooping.”370 Similarly, the district court in 
Marchwinski (overturning drug testing of welfare applicants) 
quoted Justice Marshall to ask, “Would the majority sanction, 
in the absence of probable cause, compulsory visits to all 
American homes for the purpose of discovering child abuse?”371 
As Justice Marshall stated in 1971, “Such a categorical 
approach to an entire class of citizens would be dangerously at 
odds with the tenets of our democracy.”372  
Justice Marshall’s warning is today’s reality. Poor 
people continue to suffer privacy invasions that generate 
stigma and humiliation. In addition to individual harms, this 
class differential in privacy harms democracy. Two in-depth 
studies demonstrate the link between surveillance and 
decreased democratic participation by the poor. First, Joe Soss, 
in his study of welfare, has explained that poverty “strip[s] 
individuals of the ability and time needed to follow or participate 
in political affairs,” as well as “the autonomy needed for self-
government.”373 Moreover, interactions with welfare workers 
leave recipients “pessimistic about government’s responsiveness 
and the efficacy of political action.”374 As a result, being a welfare 
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recipient “reduces the odds that a person will vote to slightly less 
than half of what it would have been otherwise.”375 For poor 
women, public benefits programs are their “most direct exposure 
to . . . [political] institution[s],”376 and the lessons welfare 
recipients learn there “have significant consequences for broader 
patterns of political action.”377 Surveillance is one way that the 
welfare system “position[s] clients as objects of paternalism,” 
which in turn leaves them feeling that government is not 
responsive to their concerns.378  
Second, John Gilliom has also studied how welfare 
surveillance suppresses political action. He found that while 
welfare mothers resist state control over their lives, they do not 
use litigation or democratic processes to do so.379 Rather than 
viewing privacy violations from a rights-based perspective, they 
“focus on need and on their duties to care for their families.”380 
Thus, their methods of opposition are more subtle; for instance, 
they earn unreported income to supplement meager welfare 
checks.381 While this defiance sustains individual autonomy in 
the face of the state’s power, it also causes stress to welfare 
mothers who fear getting caught and possibly losing benefits or 
being punished criminally.382 Moreover, it obviates political 
organizing and leaves surveillance structures intact. 
Likewise, among her low-wage coworkers, Barbara 
Ehrenreich found a complete lack of political consciousness or 
defiance of workplace privacy intrusions. As she explains, her co-
workers could not just “get-up-and-go”; rather, their mobility was 
constrained by lack of transportation or child care, as well as a 
lack of information with which to compare employers.383 As a 
result, there is no competitive market pushing employers to treat 
employees more fairly. Further, management engenders a lack of 
self-respect in employees by subjecting them to random 
searches.384 Resistance in the low-wage workforce often comes in 
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the form of lower productivity; sometimes, workers quit in 
frustration.385 There is little political resistance. Ehrenreich 
comments, “We can hardly pride ourselves on being the world’s 
preeminent democracy, after all, if large numbers of citizens spend 
half their waking hours in what amounts, in plain terms, to a 
dictatorship.”386 The “dictatorship” is maintained, in part, by 
surveillance. 
This class differential in privacy should be a concern to 
all Americans. It harms individuals by denying them full respect 
as citizens and limiting their autonomy. It decreases democratic 
participation, which in turn means there is less political check 
on privacy violations. The privacy differential also exacerbates 
income inequality by reinforcing class lines and disempowering 
people who in turn become too downtrodden⎯or busy trying to 
survive⎯to challenge public policies. The result is a downward 
cycle of disempowerment and class division. These costs are 
incurred with almost no countervailing benefits to individuals or 
society, other than the societal satisfaction that comes from 
censuring the “moral laxity” of people “unable to thrive within a 
capitalist economy.”387  
Of course, an equality approach means that privacy is 
only as secure as the majority has it. If Americans cross class 
lines and advocate together to preserve privacy and resist 
surveillance, we are more likely to restrain abuses of power. 
The scientists in Nelson v. NASA objected to intrusive 
government questioning conducted for what they believe are 
bogus security reasons. Poor Americans can relate; they have 
long been exposed to the prying eyes of the state. Middle-class 
and wealthy Americans need to realize that novel surveillance 
techniques are typically used first on the poor. By the time 
these strategies spread beyond controlling the poor, any 
“reasonable expectations” against their use have dissolved.  
What can equality add to privacy law and policy? It has 
limited constitutional legs due to the lack of equal protection 
for the poor. Laws that distinguish on the basis of wealth are 
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subject to mere rational basis review, and the state can usually 
assert a societal reason for intruding on individual privacy. It 
is a difficult scale to tip. Nevertheless, equality can inform 
other constitutional provisions. For instance, under the Fourth 
Amendment, a government search may not be reasonable if 
targeted at individuals solely on class grounds.388 This is 
intimated in Ferguson and articulated in Marchwinski. 
Moreover, equality norms could be folded into the Fair 
Information Principles that inform privacy laws and policies. 
These principles currently focus on preventing unknowing 
disclosure to third parties. However, they could be expanded to 
cover the data collection phase and to forbid collection practices 
that intrude on privacy in a demeaning, humiliating, or 
stigmatizing way. In addition, statutory protections for 
workplace monitoring could be enacted that give employees 
greater notice about surveillance and limit tactics that are 
disproportionate to achieve employer objectives. At the same 
time, employers should recognize and replicate successful 
monitoring programs that give employees notice about 
monitoring, as well as a voice in surveillance strategies. 
Finally, the common law could recognize the privacy interests 
of and harms to low-wage employees as a group, rather than 
disaggregating claims down to an individual level. Rather than 
asking if a specific person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a specific workplace, courts could consider whether 
employees have any reasonable expectation to be treated with 
dignity by employers. In short, our privacy policies and 
practices should be examined to ensure that they do not single 
out a specific class of persons for stigma. The ideal of equality 
can help provide a check against such targeted surveillance.  
CONCLUSION 
Due to advanced technologies, all Americans face 
corporate and governmental surveillance. However, poor 
Americans face different and more intense privacy violations 
than do wealthier Americans. While most Americans are 
vaguely aware that they are subject to surveillance, they do not 
feel its effects concretely, and they are willing to relinquish some 
privacy for increased security and for the conveniences of 
technology. Yet for the poor, surveillance is neither vague nor 
invisible. Rather, along the welfare-to-work continuum, poor 
  
 388 See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
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people face privacy intrusions at the time that the state or 
their employers gather data. This data collection tends to 
stigmatize and humiliate, not only compounding the harmful 
effects of living in poverty, but also dampening democratic 
participation by the poor.  
Yet privacy law is focused on middle-class concerns about 
limiting the disclosure of personal data so that it is not misused. 
By contrast, the poor interact with the government and low-
wage employers in ways that are ongoing and interpersonal, and 
as a result, the “right to be left alone” embodied in current 
privacy law does not protect their interests in dignity and 
autonomy. Privacy law, in its constitutional, statutory, and 
common law dimensions, protects reasonable expectations of 
privacy, but courts have long held that people give up 
expectations to privacy when they seek help from the 
government or go to work. The law thus reinforces the existing 
class differential in privacy practices. This class differential has 
costs not only for the poor, but for all citizens. The poor do not 
need to be left alone; they need to be treated with dignity. 
Privacy should not be for sale. All Americans would benefit 
from enhancing the privacy rights of the poor, and united, we 
can provide a powerful check on expanding surveillance that 
impacts the poor and rich alike. 
